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THE ARBITERS OF DECENCY: A STUDY OF
LEGISLATORS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT ROLE
David Niven & Aliza Plener Cover*
Abstract: Within Eighth Amendment doctrine, legislators are arbiters of contemporary
values. The United States Supreme Court looks closely to state and federal death penalty
legislation to determine whether a given punishment is out of keeping with “evolving standards
of decency.” Those who draft, debate, and vote on death penalty laws thus participate in both
ordinary and higher lawmaking. This Article investigates this dual role.
We coded and aggregated information about every floor statement made in the legislative
debates preceding the recent passage of bills abolishing the death penalty in Connecticut,
Illinois, and Nebraska. We categorized all statements according to their position on the death
penalty, their subject matter, and any references they made to the courts and Constitution. We
also collected basic facts about the legislators, including about political party, race, education,
and profession. We present our quantitative and qualitative findings here.
Building upon these findings, we critically examine the Court’s use of legislation as an
“objective indicator” of “evolving standards of decency.” We identify disconnects between
legislative outcomes and community “standards of decency,” and we analyze legislators’
understanding of their constitutional significance and why their level of self-awareness may
matter. Finally, we consider how legislative debates—rather than outcomes alone—might
provide insights into contemporary values. In particular, the strong concern we observed over
wrongful execution may support more robust Eighth Amendment protections for those
claiming actual innocence.
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INTRODUCTION
An enduring debate among jurists and legal academics concerns the
proper role of legislative history in the interpretation of statutory text.1
This Article considers how legislative history might be used in another
context in which judges analyze legislative action: the Eighth Amendment
inquiry into “evolving standards of decency.” In this context, legislation
matters not for its own sake but as a symbol of something greater:
society’s contemporary moral standards.
In its modern death penalty jurisprudence, the United States Supreme
Court looks to society’s “evolving standards of decency” in deciding
whether a particular punishment practice violates the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment.”2 To discern these
“evolving standards” in the death penalty context, the Court refers to two
primary “objective indicators”: state legislation and capital sentencing
data.3 In doing so, the Court acknowledges in uniquely explicit terms the
interaction between its constitutional pronouncements and popular will.
Majoritarian decision-making by legislatures and juries impacts the
trajectory of Eighth Amendment law.
1. Compare, e.g., Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 767, 782–83 (2018)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (defending the Court’s reliance on legislative history), with id. at 783–84
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (critiquing that same reliance). See
also, e.g., Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Tr. Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (critiquing the resort to legislative history);
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845,
847 (1992) (defending the use of legislative history).
2. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–13 (2002).
3. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (“The clearest and most reliable objective evidence
of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures. We have also looked
to data concerning the actions of sentencing juries.” (citing cases)), abrogated on other grounds by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (citing
cases), modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).
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A substantial body of legal scholarship is devoted to the Court’s
“evolving standards of decency” analysis—–to whether the Supreme
Court is accurately deciphering society’s “standards of decency” and to
whether it should be engaging in that inquiry in the first place.4 Scholars
frequently criticize the doctrine for being too majoritarian—for failing to
place a sufficient counter-majoritarian check upon harsh punishments
imposed through political processes.5 And some scholarship has
specifically critiqued the use of legislation as the primary indicator of
society’s evolving standards of decency.6 According to these critiques,
legislative outcomes are imprecise barometers of morality: they bear
useful simplicity as a judicial shorthand, but that simplicity can also
obscure important details and may in some cases be used to produce
deceptive signals of society’s values.7
This Article advances these scholarly discussions by peering behind
death penalty legislation to the debates that preceded them. We conducted
a study analyzing the floor debates leading to three recent legislative
actions abolishing the death penalty: from Connecticut in 2009 and 2012,
from Illinois in 2011, and from Nebraska in 2015.8 We coded and then
aggregated information about every floor statement made in these debates,
including about the types of justifications made for and against the death
penalty, and about all references made to the United States Supreme Court
and to constitutional law.

4. For a sampling of such scholarship, see for example Ian P. Farrell, Strict Scrutiny Under the
Eighth Amendment, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 853, 854 (2013) [hereinafter Farrell, Strict Scrutiny]; Tonja
Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation As Evidence of
an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089 (2006); Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding
Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1 (2007); Susan Raeker-Jordan, Kennedy, Kennedy, and the Eighth Amendment:
“Still in Search of A Unifying Principle”?, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 107 (2011); Mary Sigler, The Political
Morality of the Eighth Amendment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 403 (2011); Robert J. Smith, Bidish J.
Sarma & Sophie Cull, The Way the Court Gauges Consensus (and How to Do It Better), 35 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2397 (2014); John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth
Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1749–57 (2008).
5. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 69 (1980) (“[I]t makes no sense to
employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for protecting minorities from the value
judgments of the majority.”); Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1098 (“[I]t is axiomatic that the Constitution is
meant to protect citizens from the whim of political majorities; as such there is a fundamental
theoretical problem with interpreting a constitutional provision on the basis of whether there is a
national consensus for or against it.”); Lain, supra note 4, at 1 n.1 and accompanying text (citing
scholarship); Raeker-Jordan, supra note 4, at 137 (critiquing the Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976), plurality for “improperly put[ting] its thumb on the scale toward majoritarian control of the
Eighth Amendment and away from protection of individual rights”).
6. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1091–93; Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2421.
7. See Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1092–93; Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2420–23.
8. In 2013, Maryland also repealed the death penalty. However, we did not include Maryland in
this Article because legislative transcripts were not available for us to review.
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In this Article, we report qualitative and quantitative findings from our
study and use these findings to investigate three interrelated questions.
First, scholars have argued that legislation does not reliably encapsulate
public morality on the death penalty. What can legislative history teach us
about the viability of legislative outcomes as “objective indicators” of
“evolving standards of decency”?
Second, many have voiced concerns that the “evolving standards of
decency” doctrine cedes too much control over individual rights to the
whims of majoritarian legislators. But little attention has focused on how
legislators understand the constitutional dimensions of their lawmaking
in the death penalty context. What insights can legislative debates provide
into the institutional dynamics between courts and majoritarian
legislatures in the Eighth Amendment context?
Third, some have criticized the reliance on legislative outcomes and
jury verdicts, rather than other available data points, as the “objective
indicators” of contemporary values. If we understood legislative debates
themselves to contain clues into “evolving standards of decency,” what
lessons about societal standards might we discern?
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the Court’s
“evolving standards of decency” doctrine, the relevance of state
legislation to the Court’s constitutional analysis, and some prominent
critiques of the doctrine. Part II explains the methodology of our study.
Part III presents our major findings, including information we aggregated
about the overall character of the debates and anecdotal information we
collected about particularly illuminating statements.
Part IV connects the results of our study to Eighth Amendment
doctrine. We find support for the critique that state legislation is an
imperfect indicator of society’s “evolving standards of decency.”
Moreover, we find that the legislators in our study demonstrated little
understanding of their constitutional significance—and, indeed, of
judicial processes and constitutional law more generally—an ignorance
that may have both negative and positive consequences for Eighth
Amendment doctrine as a whole. Finally, we observe a strong moral
concern throughout the debates over executing the innocent and consider
how that concern might be incorporated into Eighth Amendment doctrine.
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A central pillar of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is its
assessment of society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Chief Justice
Warren first introduced that phrase in his plurality opinion in Trop v.
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Dulles,9 writing that the “scope” of the Eighth Amendment is not “static”;
rather, “[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”10 The
Court later clarified that society’s “evolving standards of decency” should
be gauged in reference to “objective indicators”11 rather than defined
according to the Court’s own subjective impressions. To date, the Court
has specifically endorsed two principal sources for “objective evidence of
contemporary values” in its “evolving standards of decency” analysis:
“the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures” and “data
concerning the actions of sentencing juries.”12
Although emphasizing “evolving standards of decency,” the Court has
never deferred wholly to contemporary practice, but has insisted that, in
the end, its own judgment of a punishment’s constitutionality is
controlling.13 Nevertheless, the inquiry into “objective indicators” of
“evolving standards of decency” has been an essential component of the
Court’s analysis. Indeed, the Court has never parted ways from the
“standards of decency” it has discerned14—at least not in any death
penalty case.15 And the Court has frequently relied heavily on its reading
9. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
10. Id. at 101.
11. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277–79 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (“Proportionality review under those evolving standards should
be informed by ‘objective factors to the maximum possible extent . . . .’”) (citation omitted)).
12. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S.
304 (2002).
13. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (“Consensus is not dispositive. Whether the
death penalty is disproportionate to the crime committed depends as well upon the standards
elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.” (citing cases)), modified, 554 U.S. 945
(2008); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (“[I]n cases involving a [national] consensus, [the Court’s] own
judgment is ‘brought to bear,’ . . . by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment
reached by the citizenry and its legislators.” (citation omitted) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion))); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(“As we have seen, however, the Eighth Amendment demands more than that a challenged
punishment be acceptable to contemporary society. The Court also must ask whether it comports with
the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment.”).
14. As we will discuss shortly, some scholars and jurists have read from this consistency that the
Court is able to manipulate the “objective indicators” to such that they “indicate” whatever it is that
the Court wishes to conclude. See infra notes 46–52 and accompanying text.
15. In at least one non-capital case, the Court’s decision did arguably depart from the “objective
indicia” of “evolving standards of decency.” In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), a case which
struck down as unconstitutional a mandatory punishment of life imprisonment without parole for a
juvenile homicide offender, the Court deemed the “objective indicia” inquiry unnecessary altogether
because its holding was dictated by prior precedent. Id. at 483 (“[O]ur decision flows
straightforwardly from our precedents: specifically, the principle of Roper, Graham, and our
individualized sentencing cases that youth matters for purposes of meting out the law’s most serious
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of evolving standards to justify the outcome it reaches. In Gregg v.
Georgia,16 the Court reinstated the death penalty17 four years after striking
it down as unconstitutionally administered in Furman v. Georgia.18 The
justices were moved by strong empirical evidence in the wake of Furman
that the nation’s “standards of decency” had not evolved beyond the death
penalty.19 The Court weighed heavily the post-Furman re-enactment of
death penalty statutes by thirty-five state legislatures and by Congress, as
well as the sentencing of 460 individuals to death by March of 1976.20
After Gregg, the “evolving standards of decency” analysis retained
prominence, and contemporary standards have been invoked numerous
times since then to justify Eighth Amendment opinions.21 Most
interestingly, in Atkins v. Virginia22 and Roper v. Simmons,23 changing
“objective indicators” appeared to directly alter the previously settled
scope of the Eighth Amendment’s protection. In Atkins, the Court held
that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of intellectually
disabled24 offenders,25 without confessing that it had erred thirteen years

punishments. When both of those circumstances have obtained in the past, we have not scrutinized or
relied in the same way on legislative enactments.”); id. at 484 n.11. Justice Alito in dissent sharply
criticized the shift: “What today’s decision shows is that our Eighth Amendment cases are no longer
tied to any objective indicia of society’s standards. Our Eighth Amendment case law is now entirely
inward looking.” Id. at 514 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Professor Ian Farrell has asserted that the sidestepping of the “objective indicia” analysis in Miller
is a harbinger of things to come and that “the Court is likely to follow Miller in declining to employ
Objective Indicia Analysis, and that ultimately, the methodology will be abandoned entirely.” Farrell,
Strict Scrutiny, supra note 4, at 903–04.
16. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
17. Id. at 179–82 (plurality opinion).
18. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
19. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179–82 (plurality opinion).
20. Id. Note that Furman struck down the death penalty as administered, but a majority of the Court
did not hold the death penalty per se unconstitutional. Id. at 168–69 (explaining the precedential effect
of Furman). Thus, thirty-five states rewrote their death penalty statutes after Furman in an attempt to
conform their laws to that decision’s constitutional requirements. Id. at 179–80.
21. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788–96 (1982) (conducting an “objective indicia”
analysis in holding unconstitutional the death penalty for offenders who neither killed nor intended to
kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593–97 (1977) (plurality opinion) (conducting an “objective
indicia” analysis in holding unconstitutional the death penalty for the rape of an adult).
22. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
23. 543 U.S. 551 (2004).
24. The Court used the term “mental retardation” in Atkins but has since recognized that the
preferred (and synonymous) term is “intellectual disability.” Hall v. Florida, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct.
1986, 1990 (2014).
25. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 32.
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earlier when it upheld as constitutional the very same practice.26 Instead,
the Court explained that since Penry v. Lynaugh,27 “[t]he practice . . . has
become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has
developed against it.”28 In other words, a formerly constitutional practice
was now unconstitutional because the “objective indicators” of society’s
“evolving standards of decency” had changed. Similarly, when the Court
barred the execution of juveniles in Roper,29 it departed from the opposite
conclusion it had reached in Stanford v. Kentucky30 by reanalyzing the
“objective indicia” of “evolving standards of decency” and deeming them
sufficiently changed.31
As mentioned earlier, when evaluating society’s “standards of
decency,” the Court has focused on objective information “as expressed
in legislative enactments and state practice with respect to executions.”32
Other evidence of society’s contemporary morality, including
international and foreign law,33 viewpoints of professional
organizations,34 and public opinion polls,35 have appeared in some of the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment cases and arguably influenced the
Court’s analysis, but they have been discussed only tentatively and
without any binding reliance or endorsement.36 The Court has never
26. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by, Atkins, 536
U.S. 304.
27. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by, Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
28. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
29. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2004).
30. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
31. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–67. See also Stinneford, supra note 4, at 1741 (“In Atkins v. Virginia
and Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court appeared to agree that the imposition of the death penalty
on the mentally retarded and on seventeen-year-olds respectively was not cruel and unusual
punishment in 1989, when Penry v. Lynaugh and Stanford v. Kentucky were decided. Nonetheless,
the Court held that such punishments are cruel and unusual today. As Justice Scalia stated in his
Roper dissent, the decisions in Atkins and Roper are based on the proposition ‘that the meaning of our
Constitution has changed over the past 15 years—not, mind you, that this Court’s decision 15 years
ago was wrong, but that the Constitution has changed.’” (citations omitted)).
32. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 563), modified 554 U.S.
945 (2008).
33. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78; Stinneford, supra note 4, at 1751–52 (citing Roper, 543
U.S. at 575–78; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21).
34. See Hall v. Florida, 574 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993–97 (2014).
35. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (“The public sentiment expressed in these and
other polls and resolutions may ultimately find expression in legislation, which is an objective
indicator of contemporary values upon which we can rely.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins,
536 U.S. 304 (2002); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 n.25 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing
public opinion polls).
36. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“In my view, these two
sources—the work product of legislatures and sentencing jury determinations—ought to be the sole
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provided a precise formula for assessing the constitutional significance of
legislation and sentencing data. With respect to legislation, the Court has
considered both the absolute number of states that permit or reject a
particular practice and the direction and consistency of the legislative
trend.37 Although the Court does sometimes seek to decipher the impetus
behind a particular piece of legislation38 and has noted whether the
legislation passed by a large or narrow margin,39 the Court rarely looks to
legislative history to answer questions about the significance of the
legislation or to deepen its understanding of social norms. One exception
of note was Kennedy v. Louisiana,40 when the Court struck down as
unconstitutional the death penalty for child rape.41 The majority and
dissent disputed whether the Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia,42
which prohibited the death penalty for the rape of an adult,43 had deterred
state legislators from enacting legislation to punish the rape of a child.44
indicators by which courts ascertain the contemporary American conceptions of decency for purposes
of the Eighth Amendment. They are the only objective indicia of contemporary values firmly
supported by our precedents. More importantly, however, they can be reconciled with the undeniable
precepts that the democratic branches of government and individual sentencing juries are, by design,
better suited than courts to evaluating and giving effect to the complex societal and moral
considerations that inform the selection of publicly acceptable criminal punishments.”).
37. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 426 (“Though our review of national consensus is not confined
to tallying the number of States with applicable death penalty legislation, it is of significance that, in
45 jurisdictions, petitioner could not be executed for child rape of any kind.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315
(“It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction
of change.”); Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2406–11 (providing a helpful summary and explanation of
the Court’s use of state legislative data in its consensus analysis).
38. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314 (“Responding to the national attention received by the Bowden
execution and our decision in Penry, state legislatures across the country began to address the issue.”);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 298–99 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The fact that some
States have adopted mandatory measures following Furman while others have legislated standards to
guide jury discretion appears attributable to diverse readings of this Court’s multi-opinioned decision
in that case.”).
39. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (“The evidence carries even greater force when it is noted that the
legislatures that have addressed the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition.”).
40. 554 U.S. 407, modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).
41. Id. at 413.
42. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
43. Id. at 592 (plurality opinion).
44. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 429 (“Still, respondent contends, it is possible that state legislatures have
understood Coker to state a broad rule that covers the situation of the minor victim as well. We see
little evidence of this. Respondent cites no reliable data to indicate that state legislatures have read
Coker to bar capital punishment for child rape and, for this reason, have been deterred from passing
applicable death penalty legislation. In the absence of evidence from those States where legislation
has been proposed but not enacted we refuse to speculate about the motivations and concerns of
particular state legislators.”); id. at 448 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In assessing current norms, the Court
relies primarily on the fact that only 6 of the 50 States now have statutes that permit the death penalty
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The “evolving standards of decency” doctrine, with its outward-facing
and dynamic stance, can be both admired and maligned. To its credit, the
doctrine has made the Eighth Amendment a tool for progressive
protections in modern times, rather than a stagnant barrier against
eighteenth century notions of barbarity.45 And through its reliance on
“objective indicators” of contemporary values, the Court arguably has
been able to bolster the legitimacy of some its more controversial
decisions against charges of judicial overreaching, moral subjectivity, and
arbitrariness.
Yet the doctrine has also received substantial criticism from judges and
legal academics, including some who would seem to agree with the
outcome reached in several of the Court’s major cases employing it.
Commentators have advanced two primary big-picture critiques of the
Court’s reliance on “evolving standards of decency” test.
The first critique is that the test is too majoritarian.46 Critics argue that
by looking to majoritarian legislatures in defining the contours of an
individual right, the Court abdicates its counter-majoritarian role and fails
to meaningfully constrain cruel yet commonly accepted punishments.47
Moreover, from a states’ rights perspective, a majoritarian Eighth
Amendment undermines the states’ traditional freedom to serve as
laboratories of experimentation and upsets the federalism balance by
imposing some states’ views upon sister states that disagree with them.48
The other primary critique of the Court’s “evolving standards of
decency” jurisprudence is that it is merely a charade that provides cover
for the Court to reach its own desired outcome.49 According to this

for this offense. But this statistic is a highly unreliable indicator of the views of state lawmakers and
their constituents . . . . [D]icta in this Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia has stunted legislative
consideration of the question whether the death penalty for the targeted offense of raping a young
child is consistent with prevailing standards of decency. The Coker dicta gave state legislators and
others good reason to fear that any law permitting the imposition of the death penalty for this crime
would meet precisely the fate that has now befallen the Louisiana statute that is currently before us,
and this threat strongly discouraged state legislators—regardless of their own values and those of their
constituents—from supporting the enactment of such legislation.”); see also id. at 452–54 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (explaining how misinterpretation of Coker may have influenced state legislatures’ choice
not to enact the death penalty for child rape).
45. As Justice Stevens put it, “[a] claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the standards
that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the ‘Bloody Assizes’ or when the Bill of
Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
46. See supra note 5 (collecting scholarship).
47. See supra note 5.
48. Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1105–23.
49. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ian P. Farrell, Abandoning Objective Indicia, 122
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critique, the problem of “evolving standards of decency” doctrine is that
it creates the veneer, rather than the reality, of a majoritarian constraint.50
The Eighth Amendment inquiry is not too majoritarian; it is, rather, too
susceptible to the personal predilections of nine men and women in black
robes. “Evolving standards of decency” are inherently malleable. Some
attribute this malleability to ends-oriented machinations by members of
the Court51; others to the inherent ambiguity of the supposed “objective
indicators,”52 as legislative action and jury verdicts are fuzzy signals
subject to competing interpretations. Critics have also argued that the
Court’s professed reliance on these “objective indicators” creates
doctrinal instability53: the Court is simply making up Eighth Amendment
doctrine as it goes and interpreting the “indicators” in inconsistent ways
so as to match the conclusions it wishes to reach.54 To these critics, it is
no coincidence that when the Court goes on to exercise its “own
judgment,”55 its judgment always coincides with the results identified
from the objective indicators.56
Beyond these two primary conceptual critiques, other scholars have
critiqued the Court’s current means of evaluating “evolving standards of
decency,” even if we were to accept that ultimate goal. Most significantly
for the purposes of this Article, scholars have questioned the wisdom of
relying on state legislation as an “objective indicator” of contemporary
values.57
YALE L.J. ONLINE 303, 312–13 (2013); Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1094; Lain, supra note 4, at 83 (citing
scholarship making this critique).
50. See Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1094.
51. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Sigler, supra note 4, at 410–11.
53. Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1150.
54. Corinna Barrett Lain argues with nuance for a third alternative: that the “evolving standards of
decency” inquiry is both majoritarian as a doctrine and a charade, but that the Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence is nonetheless tethered to majoritarian preferences through non-doctrinal means. The
real majoritarian influence on the Court comes from extrajudicial majoritarian forces that pervade its
decision-making not only in the death penalty and Eighth Amendment contexts, but throughout its
constitutional jurisprudence. Lain, supra note 4, at 5–7.
55. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313; id. at 348–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. But see supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s decision not to engage in
the evolving standards of decency analysis in Miller, when consensus evidence was weak); Farrell,
Abandoning Objective Indicia, supra note 49, at 304 (“The real significance of Miller lies less in the
result and more in the method employed—or, more precisely, the method not employed . . . . Justice
Kagan, writing for the Miller Court, declined to apply objective indicia analysis.”).
57. There are also substantial critiques of the manner in which the Court relies on jury verdicts as
evidence of “evolving standards of decency.” See, e.g., Aliza Plener Cover, The Eighth Amendment’s
Lost Jurors: Death Qualification and Evolving Standards of Decency, 92 IND. L.J. 113 (2016)
(arguing that the Court’s failure to consider the effects of death qualification on capital jury verdicts
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First, some have asserted that state legislation on the death penalty does
not accurately represent community sentiment on that issue and thus is
misleading as an “objective indicator” of “evolving standards of
decency.”58 There are a number of reasons for a potential disconnect.
Elections are not single-issue referenda on the death penalty, and
representatives elected for their stance on, say, fiscal policy or the
economy may well depart from the constituents who voted for them on
the question of the death penalty.59 Moreover, breakdowns in the
democratic bona fides of our electoral system—such as partisan
gerrymandering—undermine the representativeness of legislatures and
create a gap between the people and their lawmakers.60 Additionally, due
to political pressures that lead toward the proliferation of harsh criminal
laws, criminal justice legislation in particular may not accurately reflect
community sentiment on these same issues.61 Furthermore, legislators
have been shown to be motivated by a multitude of forces beyond simple
public opinion when deciding which bills to support,62 and even when
they do take public opinion into account, they may miscalculate what that

skews its Eighth Amendment analysis). We do not focus on these critiques here, as our study relates
to the legislative process.
58. Edmund F. McGarrell & Marla Sandys, The Misperception of Public Opinion Toward Capital
Punishment: Examining the Spuriousness Explanation of Death Penalty Support, 39 AM. BEHAV. SCI.
500, 500–13 (1996).
59. Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2422.
60. See generally, e.g., LAURA ROYDEN & MICHAEL LI, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EXTREME
MAPS
(2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Extreme%20
Maps%205.16_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY7T-8WQH] (detailing distorting effect of gerrymandering
upon congressional elections).
61. See, e.g., William J. Bowers et al., Too Young for the Death Penalty: An Empirical Examination
of Community Conscience and the Juvenile Death Penalty from the Perspective of Capital Jurors, 84
B.U. L. REV. 609, 619–20 (2004) (citing Craig Haney, Commonsense Justice and Capital
Punishment: Problematizing the “Will of the People”, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 303, 332–33
(1997)) (explaining how legislators may “whip up”—rather than act in response to—public support
for harsh punishment); Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive
Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 890–91 (2004) (“There are good reasons
to think that the legislative process may produce statutes that systematically exaggerate a crime’s
seriousness. Legislators face powerful political pressures that lead them to ratchet up sentences. Even
a legislator who thinks a particular sentence is unwarranted or believes that her constituents, on
reflection, would view a sentence as unduly harsh (either categorically or with respect to some of the
acts that fall within its scope) may fear being tarred as soft on crime if she votes against a crime bill.”
(citations omitted)).
62. Farrell, Abandoning Objective Indicia, supra note 49, at 313.
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public opinion is.63 Legislation may also lag behind public opinion, with
outdated and under-enforced laws remaining on the books.64
Another concern with the use of state legislation as an indicator of
community sentiment on the death penalty lies with the abstract and nonindividualized nature and quality of legislative decision-making.
Legislation sets generalized policy that can be disconnected from the
human consequences of individual cases:
Unlike a jury which must see the accused in the flesh and listen
to the details of his character and background, the information
that filters into legislative debates over capital punishment is
largely abstract considerations. Deciding to impose a death
sentence after listening to the character and background of the
defendant is something altogether different. The latter is a
“reasoned moral response” based on more complete information
about the crime and the person who committed it. Whether or not
legislative judgments reflect the abstract policy preferences of the
public, legislative enactments do not tell us about how the public
feels about the punishment when it is applied to real, individual
people. The legislative process is not generally geared towards
the reality that those who commit crimes are people, too.65
If we understand our society’s “standards of decency” about punishment
to be the standards we adhere to when exposed to the facts and
consequences of individual cases, legislative decision-making may be too
theoretical to serve as an “objective indicator.”66 Similarly, Justice
Marshall, in his concurring opinion in Furman and in his dissenting
opinion in Gregg, asserted that the death penalty is unconstitutional in part
because of his belief that “the American people, fully informed as to the
purposes of the death penalty and its liabilities, would in my view reject
it as morally unacceptable.”67 Marshall insisted upon a heightened (and
hypothetical) standard of the people’s informed opinion, rather than their

63. McGarrell & Sandys, supra note 58, at 500–13; John T. Whitehead, Michael Blankenship &
John Paul Wright, Elite Versus Citizen Attitudes on Capital Punishment: Incongruity Between the
Public and Policymakers, 27 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 249–58 (1999).
64. Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 23 (2007) (“As is often the
case with penal prohibitions, support for officially discarding death penalty statutes tended not to
materialize until well after those statutes already had been discarded in practice.”).
65. Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2421 (footnotes omitted).
66. The outcomes of popular referenda might be even less considered than legislative outcomes;
thus, along this measure, we might be even more wary of ballot initiatives than legislation as
“evolving standards of decency.”
67. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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abstract and uneducated impressions, to govern the constitutional
analysis.68
A third concern about using state legislation as the primary “objective
indicator” of “evolving standards of decency” is the inherent difficulty in
ascribing underlying causal motivations to the legislators who supported
any particular piece of legislation. A legislator who votes in favor of a
death penalty abolition bill, for example, may be motivated by moral
objections to the death penalty, but she may instead be motivated by
administrative, fiscal, or any number of other concerns.69 Deciphering
which precise “standard of decency” any particular piece of legislation
“indicates” is a fraught enterprise. This challenge is even greater when the
Court seeks to interpret how abolitionist states have legislated with respect
to more narrow issues within capital punishment, such as the availability
of the death penalty to punish categories of offenders or types of
offenses.70
II.

METHOD OF STUDY

With an eye toward establishing the standards state legislators apply as
they articulate their positions on the death penalty, we analyzed the
entirety of floor debate on the issue from the Connecticut legislature in
2009 and 2012, the Illinois legislature in 2011, and the Nebraska state
Senate in 2015.71 These are the three states with the most recent legislative
repeals of the death penalty for which complete transcripts of the floor
debates were available.72 These states are distinct in political culture73 as
well as in legislative structure, as Nebraska features the nation’s only
68. Id. (“[I]f the constitutionality of the death penalty turns, as I have urged, on the opinion of an
informed citizenry, then even the enactment of new death statutes cannot be viewed as conclusive. In
Furman, I observed that the American people are largely unaware of the information critical to a
judgment on the morality of the death penalty, and concluded that if they were better informed they
would consider it shocking, unjust, and unacceptable. A recent study, conducted after the enactment
of the post-Furman statutes, has confirmed that the American people know little about the death
penalty, and that the opinions of an informed public would differ significantly from those of a public
unaware of the consequences and effects of the death penalty.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
69. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 20–21 (2009).
70. Sigler, supra note 4, at 410–11.
71. We focused on legislative debate rather than testimony given by witnesses at legislative
hearings for two primary reasons. First, and from a practical perspective, transcripts of the legislative
debates were more readily available. Second, and more importantly, our focus was on understanding
the legislators themselves, and the arguments they chose to bring to the legislative floor, as it is the
legislators who ultimately determine the direction of state law.
72. Maryland repealed the death penalty in 2013, but we were unable to obtain transcripts of the
debates preceding the repeal. MD. CODE ANN., Death Penalty § 71–79 (West 2018) (repealed 2013).
73. DANIEL ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 9, 18 (1966).
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unicameral legislature while Connecticut and Illinois have a traditional
bicameral House of Representatives and Senate.
A.

An Overview of Legislative Action

In Connecticut, a serious legislative effort to repeal the death penalty
was launched in 2005. In 2007, two men perpetrated a horrific home
invasion, sexually assaulting and murdering a mother and her two
daughters in Cheshire, Connecticut. The case drew national and
international media attention and was, not surprisingly, a frequently
discussed topic when the repeal effort was renewed in 2009.74 While the
State House of Representatives (90-56) and State Senate (19-17) did vote
to repeal the death penalty, Connecticut Governor Jodi Rell (Republican)
vetoed the repeal, and the Senate lacked the votes to override the veto.75
In 2012, a repeal bill was again heard in the legislature and again passed
both the House (86-62) and Senate (20-16). Connecticut Governor Daniel
Malloy (Democrat) signed the bill into law.76 The Cheshire case was again
a significant factor in the legislative debate, with some legislators moved
to oppose the bill based on the depravity of the crime, and others satisfied
by a provision in the repeal bill that maintained the death sentences for
the two men convicted in the Cheshire case and for nine others on death
row. That provision was later overturned by the Connecticut Supreme
Court, resulting in life without parole sentences for the eleven men who
had been on death row.77 At the time of the 2012 repeal, a Quinnipiac
University poll found 62% of Connecticut voters opposed abolishing the
death penalty.78
In Nebraska, the state Senate passed a bill to repeal the death penalty
in 1979.79 The bill was vetoed by Governor Charley Thone
74. See, e.g., RYAN D’AGOSTINO, THE RISING: MURDER, HEARTBREAK, AND THE POWER OF
HUMAN RESILIENCE IN AN AMERICAN TOWN 190 (2015) (documenting the media swarm that
descended on the town and the victims’ family).
75. Chris Keating, Rell Vetoes Bill to Abolish Death Penalty, HARTFORD COURANT (Jun. 6, 2009),
http://articles.courant.com/2009-06-06/news/death-penalty-veto-0605.art_1_death-penalty-ultimatepenalty-abolition [https://perma.cc/CU6K-XW4H].
76. Susan Campbell, What’s Next for Death Penalty Abolition Group?, HARTFORD COURANT (Apr.
17,
2012),
http://articles.courant.com/2012-04-17/news/hc-campbell-cnadp-041720120417_1_repeal-organization-regroups-death-row [https://perma.cc/9SS9-QLJX].
77. See State v. Peeler, 140 A.3d 811, 811 (Conn. 2016).
78. Connecticut Voters Split on Death or Life Without Parole, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds;
But Voters Say Abolishing Death Penalty Is Bad Idea, QUINNIPIAC UNIV. (Apr. 25, 2012),
https://poll.qu.edu/connecticut/release-detail?ReleaseID=1739 [https://perma.cc/4FKT-LRBG].
79. LARRY W. KOCH, COLIN WARK & JOHN F. GALLIHER, THE DEATH OF THE DEATH PENALTY:
STATES STILL LEADING THE WAY 107–09 (2012).
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(Republican).80 The issue came up repeatedly in the following years,
including a 1999 bill passed to create a moratorium on executions, and a
2007 repeal bill that came within one vote of passage.81 In 2015, the state
Senate again passed a repeal bill, and after Governor Pete Rickets
(Republican) vetoed the bill, the legislature overrode his veto by a vote of
thirty to nineteen.82
That law was challenged by a voter referendum, which placed the death
penalty question on the ballot in 2016.83 More than 60% of Nebraska
voters cast a vote in favor of keeping the death penalty in place, effectively
undoing the legislature’s action.84
By the year 2000, Illinois had exonerated more men from death row
(thirteen) than it had executed (twelve).85 Responding to what he
considered to be a crisis of injustice, Governor George Ryan (Republican)
established a moratorium on executions in 2000.86 Three years later, in the
waning days of his second term, Ryan commuted the sentences of all 167
men and women on death row.87 After a state commission offered dozens
of recommendations for reforming the death penalty in Illinois, the
legislature ultimately took up the question of repeal. In 2011 the House
(60-54) and Senate (32-25) passed a death penalty repeal bill that was
signed into law by Governor Pat Quinn (Democrat).88 While the
80. Irene North, History Shows Nebraska Unlikely to Uphold Death Penalty Repeal, SCOTTSBLUFF
STAR HERALD (Sep. 18, 2016), https://www.starherald.com/news/local_news/history-showsnebraska-unlikely-to-uphold-death-penalty-repeal/article_05e412ce-7d4d-11e6-96f897234d3fe513.html [https://perma.cc/82VZ-FV4U].
81. KOCH ET AL., supra note 79, at 110–113.
82. Mark Berman, Nebraska Lawmakers Abolish the Death Penalty, Narrowly Overriding
Governor’s Veto, WASH. POST (May 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2015/05/27/nebraska-lawmakers-officially-abolish-the-deathpenalty/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.084d63036c6d [https://perma.cc/6Z7E-94UM].
83. Paul Hammel, Nebraskans Vote Overwhelmingly to Restore Death Penalty, Nullify Historic
2015 Vote by State Legislature, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.omaha.com/news/politics/nebraskans-vote-overwhelmingly-to-restore-death-penaltynullify-historic-vote/article_38823d54-a5df-11e6-9a5e-d7a71d75611a.html
[https://perma.cc/6SGD-55HU].
84. Shelly Kulhanek, History of the Death Penalty in Nebraska, LINCOLN J. STAR (Aug. 11, 2018),
https://journalstar.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/history-of-the-death-penalty-innebraska/article_54fb4bff-7ef4-5641-abec-6f3f8a4b35c8.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2018).
85. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan Suspends Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 31, 2000),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-01-31/news/0002010058_1_delay-execution-illinois-deathrow-illinois-reinstated-capital-punishment [https://perma.cc/5UV3-49FU].
86. Id.
87. Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issues of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in Illinois, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/12/us/citing-issue-of-fairness-governorclears-out-death-row-in-illinois.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2018).
88. Patrick Thomas, Death Penalty Debate Takes New Turn with Bill, BEVERLY REV. (Jan. 26,
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legislation was not retroactive to the fifteen men then on death row,
Governor Quinn commuted their sentences to life in prison without
parole.89
Not long before legislators passed the repeal bill, a Southern Illinois
University poll found 56% of respondents in the state favored an end to
the death penalty moratorium and continued pursuit of death sentences.90
B.

Study Procedures

Across the three states, legislators gave 360 floor speeches on the death
penalty in the years under study, amounting to 284,064 total words. With
the help of trained student research assistants, we analyzed the entirety of
every speech to categorize it for the arguments made in favor or against
the death penalty and to take note of if and how legislators referenced
United States Supreme Court decisions and the Constitution.
First, we read the speech to determine its overall direction on the
issue—either in favor of the death penalty, opposed to the death penalty,
or neutral. (There were, in fact, a handful of legislators who rose to
announce to their colleagues that they were not sure what to do about the
issue.)
After a pilot effort to review approximately 10% of the available
speeches, recurring categories of arguments for and against the death
penalty found in those remarks were identified. Research assistants were
then given a definition and example of each category and proceeded to
analyze the universe of available speeches.91
We categorized speeches in favor of the death penalty for the following
topics: deterrence (the death penalty prevents or discourages crime),
retribution (a terrible penalty is required for a terrible crime), victim and
family (statements focused on the suffering of victims and/or their family),
removing dangerous person (the need to protect society from this
dangerous person), religion (an appeal to the Bible or other religious
precept to support the death penalty), public support (a reference to public
opinion or other indicator of popular support for the death penalty),
2011),
http://www.beverlyreview.net/news/featured_news/article_53d60124-e22a-59d6-a1abc03f9dd50d24.html [https://perma.cc/3JEA-ZDC9].
89. Id.
90. Press Release, Paul Simon Pub. Policy Inst., Illinois Voters Divide on Abortion, Death Penalty,
Gambling, and Gay Marriage; Favor Open Gay Military Service (Oct. 16, 2010),
https://paulsimoninstitute.siu.edu/_common/documents/opinion-polling/simon-institutepoll/2010/2010_third_release.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G5R-8JKN].
91. As a test of intercoder reliability, multiple readers analyzed fifty speeches. There were no
disagreements on the direction of the speeches, and the topic categorization measures all achieved
recognized standards of reliability (Krippendorff’s alpha >0.67).
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prosecution tool (the death penalty is needed to help prosecutors do their
job and/or achieve favorable plea agreements), longstanding
practice/tradition (focus on long use of the death penalty in the state or
nation), and Court/Constitution (an argument built on supportive aspects
of United States Supreme Court decisions or the Constitution).
We categorized speeches against the death penalty on the following
topics, some of which represent a direct counterpoint to advocates’
positions: not a deterrent (the death penalty does not discourage crime or
lower murder rates), arbitrary (who is subjected to the sentence is
arbitrary, unfair, or not based on the severity of the crime), racial disparity
(the process is based on the race of the defendant or victim, or racism in
society at large), cost (a focus on the resources necessary to pursue death
penalty cases), futility of eye for an eye (questions proportionality of the
sentence relative to the way other crimes are punished), innocence
(mentions examples of exonerations from death row or the possibility of
making mistakes), cruelty (mentions the pain of the procedure or of the
process to the defendant), lack of closure (the victim’s family does not
benefit from the process), alternative sentences (the value of life without
parole and other harsh sentences), prosecution power (prosecutors are too
powerful, have too much discretion, or are prone to misconduct), religion
(an appeal to the Bible or other religious precept to oppose the death
penalty), public support (a reference to public opinion or other indicator
of popular rejection of the death penalty), Court/Constitution (an
argument built on aspects of United State Supreme Court decisions or the
Constitution that limit or reject the death penalty), and redemption
(assertion that convicted individuals can change for the better).92
Beyond the direction and the arguments made in each speech, we took
note of the overall word count of the speech, the word count pertaining to
the courts and Constitution, and basic facts concerning the legislators
themselves (including their party, race, and education).

92. As an example of the coding process, this is how the central arguments made in a speech by
Nebraska State Senator Kate Bolz were categorized: (A) “[I] rise in support of this piece of
legislation” (coded as an anti-death penalty speech as the bill would repeal the death penalty). (B)
“Over the last decade the murder rate in the nondeath penalty states has remained consistently lower
than the rate in states with the death penalty” (coded: not a deterrent). (C) “I am a person of faith and
I don’t speak of that on this floor very often. But as a representative of the people and as someone
who campaigned as a person of faith, I do feel compelled to say that I feel as though I am representing
the people of Nebraska when I represent compassion . . . . ” (coded: religion and public support). (D)
“If we are a people of faith, we can’t only believe in the pieces about giving ourselves up to God, or
about what it means to obey the Ten Commandments, we also have to give ourselves up to the idea
that redemption is possible . . . .” (coded: religion and redemption). Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis.
B. 268, 104th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 5 (Neb. May 20, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of Floor Deb. on
Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 20, 2015)] (statement of Sen. Bolz).

13 - Niven & Cover.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/10/2018 5:52 PM

1414

[Vol. 93:1397

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

The data we collected and the methodology we employed in collecting
it serve two significant objectives. First, we provide a fuller picture of
what happened during these legislative debates—information that is
important for its own sake. We see value in aggregating and categorizing
the discussions that occurred in these legislative halls on matters of such
great significance and in sharing that information with the public.
Second, we use the contents of these debates to enrich our
understanding of how state laws—and the legislators who enact them—
relate to community “standards of decency.” These debates provide an
important window into how legislators perceive their relationship to their
constituents, which issues matter to legislators, and how legislators
understand their relationship to the Court and the Constitution. Given the
Court’s heavy emphasis upon legislative action in determining the
constitutionality of the death penalty, it is particularly important to
understand what may animate legislators who are called upon to vote on
death penalty legislation and how well these motivations align with
community “standards of decency.”93
III. LEGISLATORS ON THE DEATH PENALTY
Having read and analyzed every death penalty speech given by
legislators in the three states, we now report on the legislators’ positions
and arguments, as well as the references to United States Supreme Court
decisions in these proceedings. Consistent with the eventual outcome of
the votes, across the three states 51.7% of the speeches given were antideath penalty, 45.3% favored the death penalty, and 3.1% were neutral.
Table 1 breaks down the direction of the speeches by party and profession.
The disparity between the political parties was vast, with over 80% of
Democratic speeches expressing opposition to the death penalty and more
than 71% of Republican speeches expressing support.
There was also a considerable difference between speakers with a law
degree and those without. Among non-lawyers, just over half (52.4%) of
the speeches were in support of the death penalty. Among lawyers, twothirds (67.3%) of the speeches were in opposition to the death penalty.

93. We recognize, of course, that while we collected data from three politically distinct states, the
results we found may not be replicated if we were to study the debates leading up to death penalty
legislation in other states. Ours is a case study, rather than a statistical sampling of the legislative
history behind every piece of death penalty legislation; our results are descriptive of these debates
rather than predictive of debates in all other jurisdictions. Moreover, we recognize that there may be
a disconnect between what legislators say in the floor debates and what truly animates their behavior.
Legislators may use legislative debates to manipulate the historical record rather than to genuinely
voice their opinions. Precisely this concern has animated many opponents to the use of legislative
history in interpreting statutes.
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Table 1:
Direction of Death Penalty Speeches in
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures
A. Overall Direction of Speeches
All Speakers
45.3%
51.7%
3.1%

Pro
Anti
Undecided
B. Direction by Party
Democrats
16.6%
80.7%
2.8%

Pro
Anti
Undecided

Republicans
71.9%
24.5%
3.6%

C. Direction by Profession
Lawyers
29.1%
67.3%
3.6%

Pro
Anti
Undecided

Non-Lawyers
52.4%
44.8%
2.8%

D. Direction by Education

Pro
Anti
Undecided

No College
Degree

College
Degree

56%
40%
4%

67.2%
32.1%
0.7%

Advanced
Degree
(Non-Law)
29.3%
64.6%
6.1%

Law
Degree
29.1%
67.3%
3.6%

A similar divide occurs when the results are further broken down by
education. Among those without a college degree and among those with
a bachelor’s degree, a majority of the speeches were in favor of the death
penalty. Among those with a law degree and those with advanced degrees
in other subjects, a majority of speeches were in opposition to the death
penalty.
There is clearly an additive effect between party and education such
that Democrats with more education were least likely to speak in favor of
the death penalty and Republicans with less education were most likely to
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speak in favor of capital punishment. To wit, 90.9% of the speeches from
Republicans without a college degree were supportive of the death penalty
while 90.2% of speeches from Democratic lawyers were in opposition to
the death penalty.
Table 2:
Length of Death Penalty Speeches in
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures
Position
All speakers
Pro-Death Penalty
Anti-Death Penalty
Neutral

Word Count (mean)
789.1
912.1
688.7
663.9

The average speech on the subject was 789 words long, which amounts
to approximately six minutes in length for the typical speaker. As shown
in Table 2, proponents of the death penalty, who were ultimately on the
losing end of the vote in all three states, had considerably more to say,
averaging 912 words in their remarks, while opponents and undecided
legislators both used an average of less than 700 words. This pattern is
regularly seen in legislative debates. Those who find themselves
outnumbered tend to use more time in a last-ditch effort to convince their
colleagues to change their minds.94
A.

How Legislators Speak about the Courts and the Constitution

By and large, state legislators do not focus their attention on the
Constitution or United States Supreme Court rulings when they discuss
the death penalty. In fact, among legislators speaking in favor and against
the death penalty, 90% fail to mention any aspect of the Court’s rulings
or the Constitution in support of their position. As a proportion of their
entire remarks, the figures are even more pronounced. While the mean
length of legislators’ remarks on the death penalty is 789 words, their
speeches contain an average of only twenty-five words focused on the
Court or the Constitution. That equates to dedicating roughly 3% of their
words to matters of the Court and Constitution. While proponents of the
94. Also, as a matter of simple math, time for legislative debate is often split equally among
proponents and opponents. Whichever side is larger, therefore, must necessarily split their time among
more members, thus producing shorter speeches. See, e.g., Sven-Oliver Proksch & Jonathan B. Slapin,
Institutional Foundations of Legislative Speech, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 3, 520 (2012) (theorizing that in
some legislative systems, individual legislators will have less time to debate as their party size
increases).
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death penalty have more to say than opponents on the Courts and
Constitution, the difference is slight.
Table 3:
Mentions of the Courts and the Constitution in Death Penalty
Speeches in Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures
All
Court/Constitution 25
Word Count
(mean)
Court/Constitution 8.2
Mentioned (%)

Pro-Death
Penalty
27.2

Anti-Death
Penalty
24

10

7

Legislators often challenge their opponents’ understanding of the law
surrounding the death penalty. Nebraska State Senator Ernie Chambers
chastised his colleagues’ lack of knowledge or even interest in seminal
Court rulings:
Because you don’t study. You don’t pay attention . . . . [The
courts] started returning a lot of these cases by saying, “we uphold
the conviction but we overturn the death sentence.” And then they
will give examples of where lawyers slept during the trial, where
they came to court intoxicated. You all won’t read decisions by
U.S. Supreme Court judges to find out why they make the
decisions that they do. They have built in overlays of safeguards
to protect these people who, at the local level, are subjected to
what would be legalized lynchings.95
By contrast, Chambers’ fellow senator Beau McCoy portrayed their
chamber as being replete with constitutional scholars, noting that his
fellow senators have “a full length and breadth of an understanding and
knowledge of the Supreme Court cases regarding the death penalty.”96
Nevertheless, the relatively minimal discussion of the courts and the
Constitution seems in part a function of the difficulty understanding and
expressing the foundational legal issues at hand. Some members openly

95. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268, 104th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 128 (Neb. May 27, 2015)
[hereinafter Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 27, 2015)] (statement of Sen.
Chambers) (quotation marks added).
96. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268, 104th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 33 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015)
[hereinafter Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015)] (statement of Sen.
McCoy).
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admit they do not want to expend the time and energy necessary to better
understand the pertinent legal questions. Connecticut State Senator Scott
Frantz prefaced his remarks on the death penalty by saying, “[n]ot being
a lawyer and, hopefully, not having to learn too much more about the
judicial system . . . .”97 Others lament their discomfort with the details and
language of the issue. “Many of you are attorneys. You understand the
legal aspects,” said Frantz’s colleague State Senator Steve Cassano.98
Cassano then noted how hard it is simply to read bills on the death penalty
and other subjects, admitting, “I couldn’t understand most of them
because they [sic] written in a language I never saw before. ‘Legalese’ I
call it. I’m a sociologist.”99
Legislators’ discomfort and unfamiliarity with the legal terrain is
apparent as they struggle against ubiquitous Latin terms and other phrases.
Connecticut State Senator John Kissel refers to “the habeuses.”100
Nebraska State Senator Bill Kintner pauses in a speech to ask for help
with pronunciation (“Petition for writ of—and I’ll ask the ‘Professor’ over
here, Senator Schumacher, how to say it—certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the United States. And I’m sure Senator Schumacher can help with how
to pronounce that.”101) Nebraska State Senator Beau McCoy employs the
words “majority” and “plurality” interchangeably:
In 1976, Gregg v. Georgia, in a landmark Supreme Court
decision, a plurality, a majority of the Court found that the death
penalty was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. And I’m going
to read a quote from the court from the majority opinion on that
case that has guided this issue ever since across the country. The
plurality, therefore, concluded that, quote, the infliction of death
as a punishment for murder is not without justification . . . .102
Other times legislators’ mentions of constitutional rights devolve into
little more than an opportunity to inject politically-charged language. In
the speeches of several legislators rejecting the possibility that death
97. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578, 2009, Reg. Sess. 178 (Conn. May 21, 2009)
[hereinafter S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 21, 2009)] (statement of Sen.
Frantz).
98. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280, 2012, Reg. Sess. 260 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter
S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012)] (statement of Sen. Cassano).
99. Id.
100. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 21, 2009), supra note 97, at 130
(statement of Sen. Kissel).
101. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 16 (statement
of Sen. Kintner).
102. Id. at 33 (statement of Sen. McCoy) (emphasis added).
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sentences could be imposed arbitrarily or based upon insufficient
evidence, the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process is referred to
as “super due process,”103 “super process,”104 or “maximum due
process.”105
Table 4:
Mentions of Religion Outnumber Court/Constitution in Death
Penalty Speeches in Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures
All
Religion
13.6
Mentioned (%)
Court/Constitution 8.2
Mentioned (%)

Pro-Death
Penalty
13

Anti-Death
Penalty
14

10

7

Relying on the Constitution and court decisions is likely not the easiest
way to articulate a position on an issue that is for many legislators a cut
and dried moral question. Indeed, more frequently cited in legislator
remarks than the courts and the Constitution are religious beliefs and the
Bible. Table 4 shows that both pro-death penalty speakers and anti-death
penalty speakers invoke a religious justification for their position more
frequently than they cite a United States Supreme Court decision or the
Constitution. Also, in contrast to the shaky footing legislators seem to
have when discussing the courts, when they speak of religion legislators
tend to do so with unrestrained authority. As Nebraska State Senator Bill
Kintner put it, “We’re doing exactly as God has asked us to do in this.
And I would submit to you that we’re the only western country that still
executes people because we’re the only country that still has vestiges left
of Christianity. Europe has pretty much moved from God.”106
When legislators do engage with the Court and constitutional questions
it is typically to extract broad justification for the thrust of their position.
Which is to say, Furman and Gregg were the most frequently cited cases
and were referenced in service of making a point on the general
103. Id. at 30.
104. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 3539, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. 104 (Ill. Jan. 6, 2011)
[hereinafter H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 3539 (Ill. Jan. 6, 2011)] (statement of Rep. Durkin).
105. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 21, 2009), supra note 97, at 456
(statement of Sen. Williams).
106. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 45 (statement
of Sen. Kintner).
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acceptability of the death penalty. Indeed, these cases were practically
depicted as the last word on the subject. Citing Gregg, Nebraska State
Senator Beau McCoy said the Court had spoken on the death penalty
“most notably” in this case, labeling it a “landmark Supreme Court
decision.”107 McCoy did not mention any other Court decision on the
issue, nor even hint at any evolution in Court thinking evinced in four
decades of subsequent decisions. In contrast to Furman and Gregg, totally
unmentioned by legislators are more contemporary cases such as Atkins
and Roper, which not only place direct constraints on the pursuit of capital
sentences but also continue to affirm the centrality of state legislative
action in the Court’s practical application of the Eighth Amendment.
B.

Legislators and Contemporary Standards of Decency

In fact, rather than accurately depicting the interactive relationship
between state legislatures and the courts on the death penalty, legislators
almost unanimously depict their work as wholly dependent on court
decisions. “We have to be consistent and I think we are consistent. We are
as consistent as the courts will allow us to be,” Nebraska State Senator
Jim Scheer said,108 offering a variation on the commonly held sentiment
that legislators are constrained by the courts in ways that are neither
welcome nor necessarily logical.
In stark contrast with the way the Court operationalizes the Eighth
Amendment, legislators repeatedly suggest that they lack even the
potential power to influence the Court. Connecticut State Representative
Mike Lawlor’s comments were typical of legislative sentiment when he
said that to alter the Court’s disposition toward the death penalty “you’re
going to have to amend the [C]onstitution or change the makeup of the
United States Supreme Court.”109
The Court’s dramatic turn on the question of whether intellectually
disabled defendants can be subject to the death penalty, however, is just
one contemporary example of a Court transformation based neither on
amendment nor personnel change, but rather because of state legislative
behavior. In 1989, Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion in Penry
in which the Court found subjecting the intellectually disabled to the death
107. Id. at 33 (statement of Sen. McCoy).
108. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268, 104th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 31 (Neb. May 15, 2015)
[hereinafter Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 15, 2015)] (statement of Sen.
Scheer).
109. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578, 2009, Reg. Sess. 131 (Conn. May 13, 2009)
[hereinafter H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 13, 2009)] (statement of Rep.
Lawlor).

13 - Niven & Cover.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

10/10/2018 5:52 PM

ARBITERS OF DECENCY

1421

penalty was not in conflict with the Eighth Amendment.110 Justice
O’Connor was then part of a Court majority overturning the Penry
decision “in light of the dramatic shift in the state legislative landscape
that has occurred in the past 13 years.”111 When Penry was heard, only
two states specifically barred the use of the death penalty for intellectually
disabled defendants. When Atkins was heard, eighteen states had
exempted intellectually disabled defendants from capital sentences,
prompting the Court in Atkins to note “the large number of States
prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete
absence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such
executions) provides powerful evidence that today our society views
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average
criminal.”112
Even more striking are the legislators who not only fail to acknowledge
that decisions of state legislatures inform the Court’s view of the Eighth
Amendment but who directly contradict the premise of the Court’s
objective indicators of community standards doctrine. Nebraska State
Senator Paul Schumacher told his colleagues, “Our courts have repeatedly
said that it is impossible to divine the intent of the electorate. And,
therefore, this gives us no guidance at all.”113 In actuality, as the plurality
in Penry noted, the Court values state legislative action as “the clearest
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.”114 Which
is to say, the Court literally does rely on legislatures to divine the intent
of the electorate. Consistent with most legislative references to the Court,
Schumacher does not mention any case or otherwise explain the origins
of an assertion that defies the objective indicators concept in use for more
than four decades.
Table 5:
Mentions of Public Sentiment in Death Penalty Speeches in
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures
All
Public Support
Mentioned (%)

24.4

Pro-Death
Penalty
35

Anti-Death
Penalty
15

110. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S.
304 (2002).
111. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002).
112. Id. at 315–16.
113. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 15, 2015), supra note 108, at 77
(statement of Sen. Schumacher).
114. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331.
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Even as the Court assumes in state legislators the ability to divine, or
at minimum represent, the opinion of their constituents, in most of their
speeches legislators do not claim to be speaking on behalf of community
sentiment (Table 5). Among pro-death penalty speeches, only 35%
include a mention of public sentiment, while among anti-death penalty
speeches just 15% do. Thus, most legislator speeches do not claim a public
mandate, and even among those that do, such speeches collectively assert
contradictory notions of both the direction and relevance of public
opinion.
When legislators do speak of public opinion it is commonly presented
in a way that is anecdotal (Connecticut State Senator Rob Kane mentioned
he had heard concerns about death penalty repeal efforts while “I was
pounding the proverbial pavement, if you will, knocking on doors,
meeting with diners at coffee shops and at the local supermarkets”115) or
purely impressionistic (Nebraska State Senator Kate Bolz: “I do feel
compelled to say that I feel as though I am representing the people of
Nebraska when I represent compassion . . . .”116). It is fair to say that
legislators are not regularly employing scientific polling data to gauge
public sentiment back home.
Other legislators admit they are acting against what they perceive to be
the public’s beliefs. “Many of our constituents have pointed out . . . that
if I vote to repeal the death penalty that I could be voting against a majority
of my own constituents, and I acknowledge that that may be true,”
Connecticut State Representative Patricia Miller said.117 She added that
her colleagues will be casting “a courageous vote because they will risk
alienating their own constituents who feel strongly as they do.”118 Miller’s
colleague State Representative Tim Legeyt admitted that he planned to
cast his vote “irrespective of the leanings of my constituents.”119
Several legislators went to the opposite extreme, calling for complete
deference to public opinion by holding a binding voter referendum on the
death penalty. Illinois State Senator Linda Holmes told her colleagues, “I

115. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 21, 2009), supra note 97, at 245
(statement of Sen. Kane).
116. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 20, 2015), supra note 92, at 5 (statement
of Sen. Bolz).
117. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280, 2012, Reg. Sess. 197 (Conn. Apr. 11, 2012)
[hereinafter H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 11, 2012)] (statement of Rep.
Miller).
118. Id. at 197–98.
119. Id. at 119 (statement of Rep. Legeyt).
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don’t think we as a Body should be making this decision for the people of
Illinois. I would like to give the people of Illinois the opportunity to make
this decision themselves. Let’s have them weigh in on this. This could be
put to referendum.”120
Connecticut State Representative Arthur O’Neill took the same
position, introducing an amendment to the death penalty repeal bill to
require a public vote on the issue. O’Neill said “people voting in a
referendum” is “the ultimate law that we have to answer to. That’s the
organic law of the state.”121 Representative Miller, in the same speech in
which she acknowledged a willingness to vote against her constituent’s
beliefs, railed against O’Neill’s proposal: “It’s been suggested to me that
we should . . . take a controversial issue like this . . . and put that to a
popular vote. But I can’t help but think that our founding fathers were a
little more prescient than that and that’s why they designed representation
so that we would not have a mob rule.”122
As noted, after opponents gathered the necessary petition signatures to
place the question on the ballot, the contentious work of the Nebraska
State Senate that resulted in a death penalty repeal was ultimately subject
to a statewide referendum and overturned when more than 60% of the vote
favored reinstating the death penalty.
In short, despite their Court-ascribed status as a window of
contemporary values, legislators disagree about what those values are,
disagree about whether they are any kind of window on them, disagree
about whether the community’s values are even relevant to the matter at
hand, and provide no evidence that they would vest in themselves the
interpretive power the Court ascribes to them. Poll results in Connecticut
and Illinois and the referendum outcome in Nebraska all favored the death
penalty as legislators voted to abolish it, suggesting that legislative
behavior is a rather unreliable interpreter of public sentiment.
Connecticut State Senator John McKinney likely comes closest to
articulating the concept that the Court does concern itself with the
prevalence of death penalty practices across the fifty states. The direction
of McKinney’s explanation (“[O]ne of the standards used to determine
whether something is constitutional under the [Eighth] [A]mendment is
evolving standards of decency. And if we’re doing something that is
harsher with respect to confinement than any other state is doing, that
120. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 3539, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. 50 (Ill. Jan. 11, 2011)
[hereinafter S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 3539 (Ill. Jan. 11, 2011)] (statement of Sen. Holmes).
121. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 11, 2012), supra note 117, at 407
(statement of Rep. O’Neill).
122. Id. at 386–87 (statement of Rep. Miller).
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might be stricken down as well.”123) nonetheless implies that the Court is
the constraint on state legislative behavior rather than acknowledging that
the decisions of the other forty-nine states would effectively set the
standard here. In other words, the implication of McKinney’s comments
is that the state must follow the Court, without acknowledgment that the
Court is following the behavior of the states.
C.

Uncertain Guidance from the Court

Beyond misunderstanding the legislature’s role in influencing the
Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, legislators commonly
misconstrue United States Supreme Court guidance along other
dimensions. While multiple Court decisions permit the use of capital
punishment in only narrowly defined circumstances, and only upon
individualized consideration of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances,124 Connecticut State Representative Gary Holder-Winfield
suggests something close to the opposite when he asserts that states must
frequently impose the death penalty if they are to use it at all: “[W]hen we
want to talk about doing this rarely, we’re on troubled ground[;]” HolderWinfield said, “Because the Supreme Court said that when the death
penalty statute applies, it should be used.”125 Meanwhile, Nebraska State
Senator Colby Coash referred elliptically to a Court case that categorically
bars the imposition of life without parole sentences:
There was a Supreme Court case, and I am going to find
[it] . . . It’s going to take me a little longer to find that, but there

123. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012), supra note 98, at 304 (statement
of Sen. McKinney).
124. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–69 (2005) (“Capital punishment must be limited to
those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme
culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’ This principle is implemented throughout
the capital sentencing process. States must give narrow and precise definition to the aggravating
factors that can result in a capital sentence. In any capital case a defendant has wide latitude to raise
as a mitigating factor ‘any aspect of [his or her] character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.’ There are a number
of crimes that beyond question are severe in absolute terms, yet the death penalty may not be imposed
for their commission. The death penalty may not be imposed on certain classes of offenders, such as
juveniles under 16, the insane, and the mentally retarded, no matter how heinous the crime. These
rules vindicate the underlying principle that the death penalty is reserved for a narrow category of
crimes and offenders.” (citations omitted)).
125. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 13, 2009), supra note 109, at 147
(statement of Rep. Holder-Winfield). Though it is not clear what decision Holder-Winfield believes
established this premise, the implication that states must regularly, essentially reflexively, impose
death sentences conflicts with the Court’s demand that death sentences only be imposed after
“individualized consideration.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
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was a Supreme Court case that said if you put in life without the
possibility of parole, you usurp the governor’s and the pardons
board’s ability to commute a sentence. Therefore, you are
violating the separation of powers.126
Senator Coash did not ultimately provide the name of the case he believes
establishes a ban on life without parole sentences (a practice then in use
in forty-nine states including Nebraska) nor did Representative HolderWinfield explain the origins of his belief that the death penalty must be
used frequently to be used at all.
When Nebraska State Senator Mike Groene repurposed the famous
Potter Stewart quote (“I know it when I see it”127) to explain how the Court
goes about seeking justice in death penalty cases, he was expressing a
skepticism about the Court common among legislators. As a whole, they
cannot identify meaningful foundations under the Court’s rulings on the
death penalty, and when they do, they frequently misunderstand the core
point.
Perhaps the most frequent focus when the Court and the Constitution
were invoked was speculation about how specific legislation or a
provision within that legislation would stand up to scrutiny. In
Connecticut, for example, embedded in the bill that would abolish the
death penalty for future trials was a provision that would maintain the
death penalty for the eleven men already on Connecticut death row.
Legislators took to the floor to assert their views on the Constitution
and on the Court’s most likely response, or simply to worry that the
resolution of the question was essentially unknowable. “The State could
not and would not—could not constitutionally and would not, as a matter
of public policy—seek to execute someone for a crime they committed
today when they could not be executed for committing that same crime
tomorrow,” said Connecticut State Representative Arthur O’Neill.128
O’Neill added, “I don’t think that would stand up as a matter of
constitutional law. I don’t think the courts would permit it and I’m sure
this legislature would not want us to be doing it.”129 Similarly, State
Senator Len Fasano concluded, “[I]n my view it is unconstitutional. You

126. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 55 (statement
of Sen. Coash).
127. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 20, 2015), supra note 92, at 41 (statement
of Sen. Groene).
128. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 13, 2009), supra note 109, at 240
(statement of Rep. O’Neill).
129. Id.
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cannot treat similarly situated people differently under the context of the
law.”130
By contrast, Connecticut State Representative Lawrence Cafero
lamented what he considered the false confidence of those who believed
the state could both end (future) death sentences and maintain (existing)
death sentences. “The bill that we have before us has yet to be determined
whether or not it’s constitutional,” he said. “But you see here is the rub.
Many people are making their decision on whether or not to vote for this
because they are trusting that even if . . . it passes, those 11 animals on
death row will die.”131
While legislators could reasonably disagree about how an oft-divided
Court might respond to the particulars of their bill, some of their
colleagues made it clear that considerations of the Constitution were
secondary. “I agree that this bill is imperfect,” Connecticut State
Representative Terry Backer said, “I might question some of its
constitutionality. We have processes to challenge constitutionality, so I
will be supporting here today the bill.”132 That is, Representative Backer
expresses a willingness to support something he believes is
unconstitutional because someone else could fight it another day, in
another venue. This willingness to defy one’s own understanding of the
Constitution—to defy the oath Connecticut legislators take to “support the
Constitution of the United States”133—seems to invite skepticism and
scrutiny rather than deference to legislative intent when the Court
encounters the work product of these lawmakers.
D.

The Moral Dimension of the Death Penalty

More than any aspect of Constitutional law, legislators tend to focus
their remarks on the moral dimensions of the death penalty in their
remarks on the subject. Tables 6 and 7 list, in order of frequency, the
prevalence of each argument topic employed by pro-death penalty and
anti-death penalty speakers.

130. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012), supra note 98, at 292 (statement
of Sen. Fasano).
131. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 11, 2012), supra note 117, at 87
(statement of Rep. Cafero).
132. Id. at 93–95 (statement of Rep. Backer).
133. CONN.
GEN.
STAT.
ANN.
§ 1-25
(West
2017),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2015/pub/chap_004.htm [https://perma.cc/MK9M-DV33].
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Table 6:
Topics of Pro-Death Penalty Speeches in
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures
Retribution
Victim/Family
Public Opinion
Removing
Dangerous Person
Deterrent
Prosecution Tool
Longstanding
Practice/Tradition
Religion
Court/Constitution
*

Connecticut*
60
47
31
38

Illinois*
42
50
17
42

Nebraska*
53
25
42
28

Total*
55
37
35
33

40
24
13

42
58
100

15
8
18

28
18
14

1
14

100
8

27
6

13
10

% using argument (speakers may use more than one).

Table 7:
Topics of Anti-Death Penalty Speeches in
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures
Innocence
Arbitrary
Lack of Closure
Alternative
Sentences
Financial Cost of
Process
Not a Deterrent
Racial Disparity
Eye for an Eye
Futility
Public Opinion
Religious
Objection
Prosecution Power
Cruelty
Court/Constitution
Capacity for
Redemption of
Inmate
*

Connecticut*
42
31
36
36

Illinois*
67
38
19
38

Nebraska*
33
32
25
21

Total*
40
32
28
28

25

33

21

24

33
24
22

33
24
19

18
9
9

25
16
15

10
6

5
5

19
21

15
14

12
2
13
2

19
24
0
0

10
14
4
6

12
11
7
4

% using argument (speakers may use more than one).
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Supporters of the death penalty are more likely to discuss retribution
than any other aspect of the issue, with 55% of all pro-death penalty
speeches discussing the topic. They speak of the need for a fitting
punishment for a terrible crime. They speak of depraved people who
deserve to die. In their words, death row is populated by “murderous
savages”134 who are “pure evil.”135 They speak of the need for “old west
justice”136 and boast of being personally “pro-death.”137 Notable crimes
and victims are a recurring point of emphasis. The notorious 2007 home
invasion in Cheshire, Connecticut was a frequent subject of commentary
in the Connecticut legislature. State Senator Michael McLachlan, for
example, quoted at length from a surviving member of the family,
Dr. Petit . . . he made an incredible impression on my feeling
about this issue . . . . “If you allow murderers to live, you are
giving them more regard, more value than three women who
never hurt a soul and played by all of society’s rules for all of their
short lives. My family got the death penalty and you want to give
murderers life. That is not justice. Any penalty less than death for
murder is unjust and trivializes the victim and the victim’s family.
It is immoral and unjust to all of us in our society.”138
The moral dimension that animated death penalty opponents, and the
topic discussed more frequently than any other in their speeches, was the
prospect of punishing the innocent. Forty percent of all speeches against
the death penalty include a discussion of those exonerated from death row
or the danger of carrying out a death sentence against an innocent person.
Though it is certainly also a legal issue, these legislators focus on what
they see as the indefensible moral aspect. For example, after quoting an
expert who testified that innocent people have been executed, Connecticut
State Senator Gayle Slossberg said, “Is that the society we want where we
execute innocent people? And if our society executes an innocent person,
there’s no possibility of fixing that error. There is no turning back.
Haven’t we then become the evil we are trying to eliminate?”139
134. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 12 (statement
of Sen. Schnoor).
135. Id. at 28 (statement of Sen. Riepe).
136. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 27, 2015), supra note 95, at 104
(statement of Sen. Bloomfield).
137. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 28 (statement
of Sen. Riepe).
138. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 21, 2009), supra note 97, at 366
(statement of Sen. McLachlan).
139. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012), supra note 98, at 280 (statement
of Sen. Slossberg).
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These dueling portrayals of evil underscore the difficulty proponents
and opponents have in reaching each other. To each side, the perpetration
of evil is indefensible and must be opposed with unrestrained vigor. But
these legislators look for and see evil in different places.
It is perhaps not surprising given the opposing moral visions on display
here that debate on the death penalty is often deeply and openly personal.
Nebraska State Senator Lydia Brasch challenged her colleague Ernie
Chambers, the prime sponsor of the bill, to repeal the death penalty: “We
have heard Senator Chambers tell us several times . . . that he does not
believe in God. So I don’t understand why repeal here is a priority to
him.”140 There is, at times, a near mocking quality as those on one side
distinguish themselves from those with whom they disagree. As Nebraska
State Senator Groene put it, some people “in our lily-white society, who
live their perfect middle-class lives, say we can’t pull the lever, well, God
made people who can.”141
Rather than focus on his colleagues, Nebraska State Senator Colby
Coash trained his attention on the behavior of some death penalty
supporters. Coash described his personal journey on the issue that began
with a road trip during college to witness the atmosphere of an execution:
I made a trip down to the state penitentiary because I thought that
would be something to see, to be part of justice, to be part of an
execution. And when I went down there, there were two sides of
people that were there to witness. And there was a side there that
thought it was a party, and they had a barbeque. And they had a
countdown like it was New Year’s Eve. They had a band. Can
you imagine that, colleagues? A band at an execution. And on the
other side of that parking lot were people who were quietly
praying, trying to be a witness to life . . . . And I was on the wrong
side of that debate that night, and I never forgot it.142
Accounts like these underscore that for many legislators this is an issue
that is intensely felt if not always intensively studied.
Several disparities between the states were no doubt informed both by
political culture and the particular circumstances of the death penalty’s
implementation. In Illinois, with exonerations having outnumbered
executions, anti-death penalty legislators were more likely to focus on
innocence than their peers in Connecticut and Nebraska. Meanwhile,
140. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 27, 2015), supra note 95, at 22 (statement
of Sen. Brasch).
141. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 20, 2015), supra note 92, at 41 (statement
of Sen. Groene).
142. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 7 (statement
of Sen. Coash).
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advocates for the death penalty were united in their efforts to place the
death penalty in the context of a time-honored and spiritually appropriate
response to crime. Several distinct patterns in argument types are
employed when the data are broken down by race and party. Among those
in opposition to the death penalty, African American legislators (29.2%)
are almost three times as likely as white legislators (10.7%) to cite racial
disparities in the process. Among both those advocates and opponents,
Republicans are vastly more likely to cite religion as a reason to support
(among proponents, 15.9% of Republicans and 0% of Democrats cited
religion) or oppose the death penalty (among opponents, 29.8% of
Republicans and 8.5% of Democrats cited religion).
In total, the legislative battle on the death penalty takes place some
distance from that of a dry constitutional debate. It is about God and evil
and lynchings and “old west justice.” It is about parties held at executions
and depraved acts of violence and only seldom focused on interpreting the
Eighth Amendment or applying Court precedents.
E.

When Lawyers Speak on the Death Penalty

Among the subset of legislators who are also attorneys, the contours of
the debate are noticeably different. It will surprise few that lawyerlegislators have even more to say than their colleagues, with an average
non-lawyer speaking for 662 words while lawyer-legislators use an
average of 1078. More to the point, lawyers’ discussion of the death
penalty is much more likely to be presented in ways the Court would
recognize.
Compared to non-lawyer legislators who support the death penalty,
supportive lawyers speak almost twice as often on deterrence, one of the
main pillars upon which the Court’s embrace of the death penalty rests.
Lawyers more frequently discuss the value of removing a dangerous
person from society and the importance of the death penalty as a tool for
prosecutors. Lawyers are more likely to speak of the Court itself and the
Constitution and less likely to speak of religion. Each of these differences
reached statistical significance, meaning they were unlikely to occur due
to chance alone.143

143. Statistical significance was calculated to determine the likelihood that the difference between
the topics mentioned by lawyers and non-lawyers could be due to chance alone. Highlighted measures
in Table 8 and 9 reached statistical significance at the 95% level, meaning there is a 95% likelihood
that the difference observed is based on real differences between the groups and not due to chance
alone.
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Table 8:
Topics of Pro-Death Penalty Speeches in
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures by Profession
Deterrent
Retribution
Victim/Family
Removing Dangerous
Person
Religion/Biblical
Public Opinion
Tool for Prosecutors
Longstanding
Practice/Tradition
Court/Constitution
*difference

Lawyers
47
50
41
47

Non-Lawyers
24*
56
36
30*

0
19
38
13

17*
39*
14*
15

25

06*

is statistically significant (T-test, p<.05)

Table 9:
Topics of Anti-Death Penalty Speeches in
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures by Profession
Not a Deterrent
Arbitrary
Racial Bias
Financial Cost of Process
Eye for an Eye Danger
Innocence/Mistakes
Cruelty
Lack of Closure for
Families
Alternative
Sentences/LWOP
Prosecutors Too Powerful
Religious Objection
Court/Constitution
Capacity for Redemption
of Inmate
Public Opinion
*difference

Lawyers
31
36
20
27
12
45
09
31

Non-Lawyers
21*
29
13*
22
17
37
12
26

27

29

22
08
09
07

05*
18*
05*
02*

18

13

is statistically significant (T-test, p<.05)
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Lawyer-legislators who oppose the death penalty are also more likely
to focus their attention on the legal underpinnings of the death penalty.
Compared to their non-lawyer colleagues, they are more likely to cast
doubt on the death penalty as a deterrent and depict the process as rife
with racial bias. Anti-death penalty lawyers also are far more likely to
warn that such laws make prosecutors too powerful. These differences
reach statistical significance. Though not statistically significant, lawyer
legislators were also more likely to speak of the death penalty as
arbitrarily imposed and potentially punishing the innocent. Like lawyers
who support the death penalty, anti-death penalty lawyers are less likely
to mention religion in speeches.
Beyond shaping how they express their thoughts on the subject, some
lawyer-legislators point to law school as an experience that shaped what
they think on the subject. As Connecticut State Senator Edward Meyer
explained, his law school studies left him in doubt of any death penalty
deterrence effect and repulsed by the idea that the death penalty was
merely a tool for vengeance:
I went to law school and motivated by a criminal law professor,
studied for the first time the issue of capital punishment as we
called it. And I probably was pro capital punishment but I decided
to do my third year thesis on capital punishment. And somewhat
to my surprise, I discovered . . . that the death penalty does not
have a deterrent effect. And if it doesn’t have a deterrent effect,
what are we doing with it except—except in effect being
vindictive?144
After considering more than 280,000 words of legislative speeches on
the death penalty, several significant patterns emerge. Despite being
viewed by the Court as an objective indicator of community standards of
decency, legislators themselves dispute just what the community thinks
and how relevant that should be to their work. Their understanding of
Court precedents is generally limited or even fallacious. Instead, they
express their beliefs on the death penalty in frequently personal and moral
language. To be sure, positions and points of emphasis on this issue vary
by party, profession, and race, but little in the sum of legislative debate
suggests legislators are equipped or inclined to fill the role the Court has
given them on this issue.

144. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 21, 2009), supra note 97, at 254
(statement of Sen. Meyer).
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IV. EIGHTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
In this section, we highlight three major implications for the Court’s
Eighth Amendment doctrine from the findings discussed above. First, we
explain how our findings cast doubt on the accuracy of legislative
outcomes as indicators of “evolving standards of decency,” and we
caution against over-reliance on legislative outcomes in the Eighth
Amendment analysis. Second, we explore the implications of legislators’
ignorance of their institutional role in the development of constitutional
law. Finally, we discuss the possibility that legislative debates themselves
may provide insights into society’s “evolving standards.” In particular, we
observe that legislators in these debates frequently cited the risk of
wrongful execution as a motivation for their opposition to the death
penalty—evidence that the Court’s equivocal stance on the
constitutionality of executing the innocent may be out of step with
“evolving standards of decency.”
A.

The Viability of Legislation as “Objective Indicia” of “Evolving
Standards of Decency”

The data we collected and the findings reported above suggest that state
legislation is an imperfect indicator of “evolving standards of decency.”
Our study lends support for all the critiques of state legislation mentioned
in Part I: that legislation is an imperfect gauge of public opinion; that the
quality of legislative decision-making is often abstract and sometimes illinformed; and that it is difficult to decipher a clear signal about a single
rationale behind death penalty legislation.
First, the data support the critique that legislation may not accurately
reflect community sentiment.145 Although we cannot and do not attempt
to generalize from our case study to all state legislation, the debates we
studied did suggest a possible mismatch between public opinion and
legislative action. As discussed above, the vast majority of the legislative
145. Notably, our data set consist only of legislative debates in states that were actively considering
abolishing the death penalty. We did not collect any data about how accurately older legislation either
abolishing or permitting the death penalty reflects current community consensus. We can hypothesize,
however, that older legislation is further disconnected to contemporary community opinion. See, e.g.,
David Niven et al., A “Feeble Effort to Fabricate National Consensus”: The Supreme Court’s
Measurement of Current Social Attitudes Regarding the Death Penalty, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 83, 102–
03 (2006) (describing disconnects between public opinion and state legislation, including that “state
policies will lag current public opinion, and in some cases, be more reflective of the political culture
of another era than of today” (footnote omitted)); Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2423 (noting that
changes in the usage of the death penalty are more likely to keep in step with public opinion than
legislation, which lags behind with the force of inertia).
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debate was focused on other considerations besides public opinion about
the death penalty. Only 35% of death penalty proponents and 15% of
death penalty opponents mentioned public opinion in some form,146 and
those who did invoke public sentiment were often anecdotal or
impressionistic.147 There is little evidence from the floor debates that
legislators were attempting to voice their constituents’ sentiments on the
issue, let alone doing so successfully. Of course, we acknowledge that
legislators who share the same general world view as their constituents
may share their beliefs on capital punishment as well; even if legislators
do not explicitly invoke their constituents’ opinions, they may be
consciously or unconsciously aligned with them. Yet the limited
discussion of public opinion does suggest that the legislators were not
acting as the mouthpiece of the community and did not see themselves as
such, and it lends support to the critique that legislation does not always
echo contemporary sentiment.
Nebraska presents a particularly interesting example of the imperfect
relationship between state legislation and the public’s “standards of
decency.” After the legislature passed a bill repealing the death penalty,
Governor Rickets vetoed the bill, and the bill was then passed through a
legislative override. The citizens of Nebraska then reinstated the death
penalty through a popular referendum—significant (though not
conclusive) evidence that the legislative action was inconsistent with
popular opinion.148
A question worthy of greater study is whether and to what extent the
existence of a referendum mechanism changes the legislators’ sense of
obligation to implement the will of the people. Does it free them to do
what they believe is right, since they know that the people have the power
overturn their action directly if they disagree? Does it—like the threat of
reversal by an appellate court—channel their discretion to comport with
public opinion? Or does it encourage them to retreat from the question
altogether? For example, Illinois State Senator Linda Holmes asserted, “I
don’t think we as a body should be making this decision for the people of
146. See supra section III.B tbl.5.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 115–116; S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn.
May 21, 2009), supra note 97, at 245 (statement of Sen. Kane); Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B.
268 (Neb. May 20, 2015), supra note 92, at 5 (statement of Sen. Bolz).
148. Just as legislation may not truly reflect community sentiment, popular referenda may not
either. Problems of ballot access, disenfranchisement, low voter turnout infect the representative bona
fides of popular referenda in addition to elections, as discussed earlier. And the problems of abstract
and non-individualized thinking about matters of great moral complexity may well be more serious
in the context of a ballot initiative, where a voter may check “yes” or “no” without having given the
matter any serious thought at all, than in the context of a legislative debate.
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Illinois.”149 We did not observe any clear indication that the possibility of
a referendum shaped the relationship between the legislative outcome and
public opinion. Nebraska and Illinois have referendum mechanisms while
Connecticut does not. Public opinion was mentioned most often in
Nebraska and least often in Illinois, with Connecticut in between.
Table 10:
Public Opinion Mentions by State
Among Pro-DP Legislators
CT 31%
IL 17%
NE 42%

Among Anti-DP Legislators
CT 10%
IL 5%
NE 19%

Second, the data provide support for the critique that legislative
decision-making is more abstract and absolutist than the individualized
consideration one might find in actual cases. Much of the language used
to describe capital defendants in the debates was general, colorful, and
dehumanizing; those convicted of capital crimes were termed “murderous
savages,”150 “pure evil,”151 and so forth. To be sure, such language is
frequently used by prosecutors in individual cases, as well.152 Yet there
was virtually no nuance in the debates about the lives and individual
characteristics of the capital defendants—from either the pro-death
penalty legislators or, just as notably, from the anti-death penalty
legislators. While legislators considered the possibility that innocent
people could be convicted and sentenced to death, guilty defendants were
not discussed in any kind of humanizing or individuating way. Moreover,
the legislators demonstrated little specific knowledge about the legal
system or how capital trials work, making it doubtful that they fully
understood or had thought about the human consequences in individual
cases.
The primary mechanism by which the legislative debates narrowed
from the abstract to the individualized was in reference to specific

149. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 3539 (Ill. Jan. 11, 2011), supra note 120, at 52 (statement
of Sen. Holmes).
150. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 12 (statement
of Sen. Schnoor).
151. Id. at 28 (statement of Sen. Riepe).
152. See, e.g., Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 19 (1993) (analyzing the language of violence in the capital trial of an AfricanAmerican man tried for the murder of a young white woman).
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infamous crimes—most prominently, the horrific 2007 home invasion and
triple murder of the Petit family in Cheshire, Connecticut. The crime was
described in gruesome detail by several legislators153 who said it was so
heinous that jurors “vomited” from the evidence.154 One senator
mentioned the Petit family twelve times in his speech and said his entire
vote was based on them (“[O]ut of my real respect for the Petit family,
and Dr. Petit in particular[—]in my opinion, that man is a hero[—]I can’t
support this legislation.”).155 Others echoed that sentiment,156 calling Dr.
William Petit “the one we most owe.”157
These discussions amplified the brutality of murder and the savagery
of those who commit it. They in no way amplified or individualized the
humanity of those who would be put to death.158
We are not surprised by the abstract and vilifying tenor of the
legislative debates, even in these debates resulting in the abolition of the
death penalty. Indeed, that tenor seems entirely expected given the
generalized role that legislators play and the far more painstaking task of
seeing humanity in killers than in victims. The abstraction of the debates
was conceptually significant; however, because it made salient how the
two primary “objective indicators” of “evolving standards of decency”—
legislation and jury verdicts—involve fundamentally different types of
moral reasoning.
In the context of capital sentencing, rather than capital legislation, the
Court has strongly emphasized the importance of deliberative,
individualized decision-making—and indeed has structured its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence to facilitate it. Under the Eighth Amendment,
the factfinder must be given an opportunity for “the particularized
153. For example, one legislator asked his colleagues to put themselves in the place of surviving
family member Dr. William Petit. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012), supra
note 98, at 295 (statement of Sen. Fasano) (“[T]hey strangled and raped your wife, they tied your kids
to the bed, they poured gasoline over them, they did unspeakable things to them . . . .”).
154. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 11, 2012), supra note 117, at 45
(statement of Rep. Cafero).
155. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012), supra note 98, at 247 (statement
of Sen. Suzio).
156. Id. at 295 (statement of Sen. Fasano) (“[B]efore the Cheshire murders I really was in between
on whether I’d vote against the death penalty or not. I really, really was.”).
157. Id.
158. One interesting exception to the overall abstraction was the deeply personal story by Nebraska
State Senator Colby Coash about a road trip he took during college to witness the atmosphere of an
execution. See supra text accompanying note 142; Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb.
Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 7 (statement of Sen. Coash). Although this anecdote does not
humanize the killer, it does reflect in a personal and individualized way the seriousness of taking a
life—even the life of a murderer.
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consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each
convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of
death.” 159 The plurality in Woodson v. North Carolina160 explained:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual offender or the
circumstances of the particular offense excludes from
consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from
the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted
of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings,
but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be
subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death . . . [I]n
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death.161
Capital jury trials are thus constrained by constitutional requirements that
are designed to give the defendant an opportunity to present mitigating,
humanizing information to make a case for life.162
The capital jury verdicts that result from this evidentiary process serve
a dual function. Their most direct impact is to decide the fate of an
individual defendant. But they are also relied upon to decipher a collective
constitutional narrative; they are data points about “evolving standards of
decency.” As “objective indicators,” they point to whether society is
morally willing to impose the death penalty when also confronted with
evidence of the offender’s humanity.
This individualized moral reasoning is largely missing in the legislative
debates we studied. By and large, the legislators in these debates did in
fact treat capital defendants “as members of a faceless, undifferentiated
mass.”163 No constitutional requirement of any kind exists that requires
legislatures to engage in an exercise to humanize capital defendants, and
the debates we observed did not demonstrate such an exercise in practice.
This does not mean that legislation says nothing about society’s—or the
159. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion).
160. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
161. Id. at 304.
162. The long and sad history of ineffective legal representation for capital defendants means that
the promise of these protections has frequently been left unrealized in individual cases. See Stephen
B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst
Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1869 (1994). We certainly would not want to overstate the individuating
success of all capital trials in practice.
163. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion).
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legislators’—standards of decency. Yet the two types of “objective
indicators” of society’s morality involve fundamentally different types of
moral thinking—one required to be individualized, and one predictably
abstract.
Indeed, perhaps legislation and jury verdicts are not two data points
that one might look to in deciphering the same “standard of decency”;
they are indicators of distinct types of decency. One standard of
decency—the willingness or unwillingness to impose punishment—is
deliberately constrained by a process that aims to humanize the offender,
even while demonstrating the full force of his crimes. The other standard
of decency—the willingness or unwillingness to authorize punishment—
may be arrived at without any requirement at all to view the recipient of
the punishment as a human being.
Despite the qualitatively different deliberative processes in legislation
and jury sentencing, the Court uses both without differentiation to assess
“evolving standards of decency.” And the Court never explains, precisely,
what it means by a “standard of decency.” Is a “standard of decency” an
instinctual, gut-level moral intuition, or is it a value arrived at upon
considered reflection? Relatedly, is society’s “standard of decency” about
a particular punishment properly understood as the willingness to endorse
a penalty on an abstract level or as the willingness to apply a penalty in an
individual case? Some commentators have maintained that the Eighth
Amendment inquiry should give more weight to the punishments people
would be willing to apply in real circumstances, rather than the
punishments people would be willing to accept in the abstract.164 And
Justice Marshall would have evaluated the constitutionality of the death
penalty not according to people’s existing impressions of capital
punishment, but rather according to his prediction that “the American
people, fully informed as to the purposes of the death penalty and its
liabilities, would . . . reject it as morally unacceptable.”165 But the Court,
if anything, has given more weight to legislative processes as evidence of
“objective standards of decency,” without inquiring into the type of
deliberation or moral reasoning that occurs within them.166
One might argue that the Court’s attention to both legislative action and
jury decision-making as “objective indicators” of “evolving standards of
164. See Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2421.
165. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
166. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (“We have pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s
legislatures.’” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by
Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (2002))).
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decency” is an effort to capture both types of deliberation—that which is
applied to individual cases and that which is theorized at a more abstract
level. Perhaps this is so. But if there comes a time when a conflict arises
between the “standards of decency” suggested by the laws on the books
and those suggested by the law as enforced through capital jury verdicts,
perhaps the individualized moral reasoning of jury decision-making
should take priority.167 To rest our understanding of society’s “evolving
standards of decency” on a legislative process that is susceptible to
abstractions and resistant to nuanced individualized portrayals of capital
defendants diminishes the Eighth Amendment and the protections it
provides.
Third, and more briefly, the legislative debates demonstrate a lack of
consensus even among the legislators who agree with each other about the
core concerns at play. This does not mean that it is impossible to obtain
any useful information about the animating principles behind the
legislation.168 By analyzing the substance of the debates, we can note
trends about the issues that seemed to be more and less central to the
legislators. Moreover, as will be described infra, the Court has never
required any consensus on the rationales behind punishment—only on the
punishment’s existence vel non. But the diversity of the points of
discussion does support the critique that deciphering a monolithic
“consensus” is a challenging enterprise, even within one state’s single
legislative decision to abandon the death penalty.
B.

Legislators as Constitutional Actors

The “evolving standards of decency” test has garnered much criticism
for its reliance on majoritarian legislatures to define the scope of an
individual right under the Eighth Amendment—for giving too much
power to legislatures in the constitutional analysis.169 One of the goals of
our research was to try to discern whether legislators understand their

167. We readily acknowledge that the Court’s current approach to assessing the significance of jury
verdicts also leaves much to be desired and should be modified to more accurately represent
community values. The Court tallies capital jury verdicts for death as evidence of society’s standards
of decency without accounting for the distorting effect of death qualification, which strikes from the
jury venire all potential jurors who are unwilling to impose death as a matter of moral conviction. See
Cover, supra note 57.
168. See infra section IV.C, discussing the significance of the concerns over wrongful execution in
the legislative debate.
169. See supra note 5.
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constitutional role and the power they hold to shape the trajectory of
Eighth Amendment doctrine.170
The simple conclusion we reached from the data was no. We found
virtually no evidence that the state legislators in Connecticut, Nebraska,
and Illinois understood that their decision-making could impact the
United States Supreme Court’s analysis of “evolving standards of
decency.” Instead, the few legislators who came closest to mentioning this
issue described the Court as constraining the legislators’ independent
judgment, rather than following it.171
This ignorance of—or, at least, the absence of discussion by the
legislators about172—their constitutional role suggests that although the
“evolving standards of decency” test in some respects involves a dialogue
between the judiciary and the nation’s legislatures, in another sense the
two types of institutions are not in direct conversation at all.
Of course, we acknowledge that the legislators’ apparent ignorance
about the constitutional role they play does not, on its own, lead to the
conclusion that state legislation is an inappropriate indicator of evolving
standards of decency. Indicators need not necessarily be self-aware.
Jurors, for example, are never told and undoubtedly do not understand the
constitutional significance of their verdicts in the larger Eighth
Amendment analysis, but their individual verdicts may still reflect
something about the community’s willingness to impose the death
penalty.173 Similarly, other plausible indicators that have been advanced

170. Some jurists and commentators would argue, of course, that this power is merely illusory, as
the Court will recast legislative action in a way to justify the conclusions it wishes to reach. See Atkins,
536 U.S. at 348–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Corinna Barrett Lain argues that the majoritarian force at
play in the Eighth Amendment analysis is not the “evolving standards of decency” doctrine itself, but
rather non-doctrinal majoritarian forces that influence the Supreme Court’s decision-making more
broadly. Lain, supra note 4, at 5–7.
171. Connecticut State Senator Jason Welch depicts the Court as all but existing to thwart the will
of legislators. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012), supra note 98, at 133
(“[T]he first thing the court does is – is they read the statute . . . . I think they’re going to draw one
conclusion, which I think is the conclusion that we all want them not to draw.”) (statement of Sen.
Welch). Similarly, colleague John McKinney laments that if the court were to overturn the
legislature’s work “there’s nothing we could do about that legislatively. That’s what courts do . . . .”
Id. at 152 (statement of McKinney).
172. Again, absence of legislative debate is not necessarily equivalent to absence of knowledge.
But it does suggest that this is not something that legislators are relying on in making their decisions,
and not something they deem significant enough to mention. The ignorance about other aspects of the
legal framework seem to support the idea, moreover, that at least many legislators do not understand
the nuances of constitutional law enough to know their constitutional role.
173. However, see Cover, supra note 57, for a critique of the use of death-qualified juries’ verdicts
as an “objective indicator” of “evolving standards of decency.”
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by commentators and noted by the Court, such as opinion polls,174
international practices,175 and professional organizations’ standards,176
would serve as unwitting indicators in a constitutional analysis. To put it
in more everyday terms, a thermometer does not need to comprehend
anything at all to be an accurate indicator of the temperature in the room.
Yet it remains worthwhile to closely consider the legislators’ lack of
awareness that they play a meaningful role in the Court’s assessment of
capital punishment’s constitutionality. The legislators’ failure to
recognize their own constitutional significance lends nuance to some of
the primary conceptual critiques and defenses of the “evolving standards
of decency” doctrine itself.
One of the benefits of a constitutional doctrine that links individual
rights to objective indicators of society’s contemporary values is
increased democratic legitimacy. The doctrine ties controversial judicial
decisions that overturn punishments sanctioned by democratically elected
legislatures and authorized in individual cases by unanimous juries to the
will of those very same institutions. However, as we found that state
legislators showed no awareness that Eighth Amendment doctrine is
tethered to their own decision-making, the Court’s attempts to couch its
decisions in the legitimacy of majoritarian sentiment seem rather
ineffective. The legislators in our study gave no indication that they
perceived the Court to be acting in accordance with “evolving standards
of decency” as reflected in the decisions of democratically elected
legislatures such as themselves. If legislators are unaware of the
“objectivity” and democratic bona fides of Eighth Amendment doctrine,
it appears unlikely that ordinary Americans would have a greater
understanding. The state legislators’ failure to recognize their
constitutional role suggests the Court may not be achieving the perceived
legitimacy its doctrine was designed to inspire.177
174. See generally Niven et al., supra note 145, at 110, 113 (noting the superior reliability of
opinion polls relative to other proxy-based indicators of public sentiment).
175. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2004); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10
(1977) (plurality opinion).
176. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014); id. at 2002 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“Now, however, the Court strikes down a state law based on the evolving standards of professional
societies, most notably the American Psychiatric Association (APA).”).
177. The legislators’ failure to see themselves as playing a significant constitutional role begs the
question of what would happen if legislators embraced their constitutional role more explicitly,
morphing from constitutional indicators to constitutional actors. Legislators on both sides of the
political spectrum could engage in expressive legislation with the explicit purpose of influencing
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, even where that legislation would likely have little
practical impact on the ground in their state because of limited usage of the death penalty. For
example, lawmakers opposed to the death penalty, even in states that had already abolished the
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At the same time, the legislators’ failure to embrace their constitutional
significance may serve to weaken the majoritarian nature of the “evolving
standards” test in ways that may alleviate some of the critiques that have
been levied against it. If state legislators perceive themselves to be
constrained by the Court, even when they are not, an informal, nondoctrinal counter-majoritarian check may curtail some amount of
legislative excess in ways that may be normatively desirable.178
C.

The Evasiveness of Innocence in Supreme Court Eighth
Amendment Doctrine

In each of the jurisdictions we studied, the legislators banned the death
penalty. Should their reason for doing so matter in the constitutional
analysis?
The Court has never held that the reasoning behind the passage of
legislation has constitutional significance in the “evolving standards of
decency” inquiry. But arguably, such a rationale—if decipherable—is
itself indicative of contemporary “standards of decency,” and legislative
history is thus an under-investigated source of constitutionally significant
information. Individual floor statements may be idiosyncratic and only
tangentially relevant to the “evolving standards of decency” inquiry, and
concerns of legislators who are far outnumbered and outvoted may do
little to represent community values. But if we accept the Court’s premise
that legislation itself is an indicator of “evolving standards of decency,”
and if substantial numbers of legislators who speak in favor of ultimately
successful legislation express a consistent rationale for their support, that
rationale may be quite helpful to our understanding of the value that
legislation represents.179 Although we recognize that individual floor

practice as a whole, could introduce and seek to pass resolutions reflecting their opposition to certain
types of practices that might occur within a capital regime. On the other hand, legislators in favor of
certain capital punishment practices outlawed by the Court— such as the death penalty for child rape,
prohibited in Kennedy v. Louisiana—could seek to pass expressive resolutions (or actual legislation)
supporting such practices with an eye toward changing the Court’s perception of “evolving standards
of decency.” Cf. Richard M. Re, Can Congress Overturn Kennedy v. Louisiana?, 33 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1031, 1103 (2010) (advancing an interpretation of Kennedy v. Louisiana as having a
“democratically reversible holding”).
178. This dynamic pairs in an interesting way with Professor Corinna Barrett Lain’s argument that
although the “evolving standards of decency” test is majoritarian in nature, and although the outcomes
of the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases are largely consistent with majoritarian sentiment, those
outcomes are largely traceable not to doctrine but to the influence of non-doctrinal majoritarian forces.
Lain, supra note 4, at 5–7.
179. In the realm of statutory interpretation, legislative history is a common—though sometimes
controversial—reference point. See supra note 1; see, e.g., United States v. City of San Francisco,
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statements, in isolation, may have little persuasive value,180 policy
concerns expressed repeatedly throughout the debates may carry more
weight.
Of course, there are dangers associated with increased attention to
legislative history in identifying “evolving standards of decency.” While
legislative outcomes are defined and quantifiable, the legislative record
can be elusive and difficult to measure. Legislators may feel free to wax
poetic on the record in ways that are inconsistent with their actual views,
while legislative outcomes result from legislators’ actions rather than their
mere words. Legislative history can be manipulated and as such its use is
controversial even in the more direct enterprise of interpreting statutory
text.181
Still, it is worth comment that the most common moral preoccupation
we observed among the anti-death penalty legislators was the risk of
executing the innocent. Forty percent of the death penalty opponents
spoke with concern about wrongful convictions. Interestingly, this
“standard of decency” has only a tenuous link to existing Eighth
Amendment precedent.182 The Court has not focused on, nor articulated a
way to analyze, the risk of executing the innocent in its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. If we do take legislative history seriously as
an indicator of society’s “evolving standards of decency,” the frequent
mention of this concern points in favor of increased attention by the Court
to innocence in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
It may come as a surprise to many that the Court has never held that a
convicted yet demonstrably innocent person has a constitutional right to
be released from jail or spared execution. In Herrera v. Collins,183 the
majority went only so far as to “assume, for the sake of argument in
310 U.S. 16, 22 n.10 (1940) (“Reference to congressional debates may be made to establish a common
agreement upon the general purpose of an Act.” (citation omitted)).
180. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 929, 942–43 (2017) (opining that “floor
statements by individual legislators rank among the least illuminating forms of legislative history”).
181. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative
State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 269–71
(2013) (describing the controversy over, and decline in reliance on, legislative history since the mid1980s).
182. By contrast, the primary moral preoccupation we observed in the pro-death penalty
legislators—retribution—is well-recognized by the United States Supreme Court as a legitimate
penological basis for imposing capital punishment. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002)
(citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 798 (1982)). When exercising its independent judgment as to whether a punishment violates the
Eighth Amendment, the Court has focused on whether the punishment meaningfully contributes to
the deterrent and retributive goals of the death penalty. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–20.
183. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
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deciding this case, that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration
of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were
no state avenue open to process such a claim.”184 The Court went on to
emphasize that “the threshold showing for such an assumed right would
necessarily be extraordinarily high.”185 If we piece together the concurring
and dissenting opinions in Herrera, a majority of the justices did voice
support for the “fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is
inconsistent with the Constitution”;186 yet the Court has never explicitly
so held. Although the Court did later rule that a demonstration of actual
innocence can be a so-called “gateway” into habeas review for a petitioner
with a procedurally-defaulted constitutional claim,187 the freestanding
constitutional significance of an individual post-conviction petitioner’s
factual innocence remains uncertain.188
In light of the Court’s hesitancy to constitutionalize protections for
actually innocent habeas petitioners, it should perhaps be less surprising
that the risk of executing the innocent has played only a minor role in the
Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis to date. The Court has long held that,
because death is different in quality and finality than other punishments,

184. Id. at 417.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (joined by Kennedy, J.) (“[T]he execution of a legally
and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event.”); id. at 429 (White, J.,
concurring) (“In voting to affirm, I assume that a persuasive showing of “actual innocence” made
after trial, even though made after the expiration of the time provided by law for the presentation of
newly discovered evidence, would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner in this case.”);
id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joined by Stevens, J., and Souter, J.) (“Nothing could be more
contrary to contemporary standards of decency or more shocking to the conscience than to execute a
person who is actually innocent.” (citations omitted)).
To the contrary, Justices Scalia and Thomas would have explicitly held that there was no
freestanding constitutional innocence claim cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings. Id. at 427–28
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice (if that
were enough) for finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration of newly
discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction . . . . In saying that such a right
exists, the dissenters apply nothing but their personal opinions to invalidate the rules of more than
two-thirds of the States, and a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure for which this Court itself is
responsible. If the system that has been in place for 200 years (and remains widely approved)
‘shock[s]’ the dissenters’ consciences, perhaps they should doubt the calibration of their consciences,
or, better still, the usefulness of ‘conscience shocking’ as a legal test.”).
187. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315, 326–27 (1995).
188. See also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554–55 (2006) (declining once again to resolve what a
“hypothetical freestanding innocence claim would require” because, whatever the burden, “this
petitioner has not satisfied it”).
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there exists a need for increased “reliability.”189 In most instances, that
“reliability” has been discussed in the context of the decision to impose
death rather than life—in other words, with respect to punishment rather
than guilt. This orientation toward punishment has some exceptions. In
Beck v. Alabama,190 in deciding that a capital jury must be given the
opportunity to return a verdict of guilt for a lesser included offence, the
Court explained that the rationale behind invalidating “procedural rules
that tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination” in
capital cases “must apply to rules that diminish the reliability of the guilt
determination.”191 In Atkins, when analyzing the constitutionality of
executing individuals with intellectual disability, the Court did note the
concern that “[m]entally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a
special risk of wrongful execution.”192 And in two dissents in recent years,
Justices Souter and Breyer have discussed at some length the significance
of wrongful convictions and wrongful executions to the constitutionality
of the death penalty as a whole or of certain practices within it.
In Kansas v. Marsh,193 Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, would have struck down as unconstitutional a
statute making the death penalty mandatory when jurors found the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances to be equally balanced.194 In
reaching this conclusion, Justice Souter asserted that compelling new
evidence of wrongful convictions in capital cases demonstrates a risk of
erroneous executions and necessarily affects the Eighth Amendment
analysis:
Today, a new body of fact must be accounted for in deciding
what, in practical terms, the Eighth Amendment guarantees
should tolerate, for the period starting in 1989 has seen repeated
exonerations of convicts under death sentences, in numbers never
imagined before the development of DNA tests. We cannot face
up to these facts and still hold that the guarantee of morally
justifiable sentencing is hollow enough to allow maximizing
death sentences, by requiring them when juries fail to find the

189. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“Death, in its
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a
year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”).
190. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
191. Id. at 637–38.
192. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
193. 548 U.S. 163 (2006).
194. Id. at 203 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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worst degree of culpability: when, by a State’s own standards and
a State’s own characterization, the case for death is “doubtful.”195
Justice Thomas, writing for a majority of the Court, criticized Justice
Souter’s argument, asserting that the possibility of the erroneous
conviction and execution of innocents did not present a constitutional
problem:
Because the criminal justice system does not operate perfectly,
abolition of the death penalty is the only answer to the moral
dilemma the dissent poses. This Court, however, does not sit as a
moral authority. Our precedents do not prohibit the States from
authorizing the death penalty, even in our imperfect system. And
those precedents do not empower this Court to chip away at the
States’ prerogatives to do so on the grounds the dissent invokes
today.196
In 2015, Justice Breyer wrote a landmark dissent in Glossip v.
Gross,197 in which he called upon the Court to revisit the global question
of the death penalty’s constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment.198
Among the four primary reasons he cited for his belief that capital
punishment is unconstitutional was that its “lack of reliability” rendered
it cruel.199 He cited extensive evidence that the death penalty had been
wrongly imposed on individuals who were later exonerated and, even
worse, that innocent individuals had in fact been executed. He suggested
that “there are too many instances in which courts sentence defendants to
death without complying with the necessary procedures; and they suggest
that, in a significant number of cases, the death sentence is imposed on a
person who did not commit the crime.”200 To Justice Breyer, this evidence,
which simply did not exist at the time Gregg was decided,201 provides a
new basis for reconsidering the constitutionality of the death penalty as a
whole.
195. Id. at 207–08; see also id. at 210–11 (“We are thus in a period of new empirical argument
about how “death is different”: not only would these false verdicts defy correction after the fatal
moment, the Illinois experience shows them to be remarkable in number, and they are probably
disproportionately high in capital cases. While it is far too soon for any generalization about the
soundness of capital sentencing across the country, the cautionary lesson of recent experience
addresses the tie-breaking potential of the Kansas statute: the same risks of falsity that infect proof of
guilt raise questions about sentences, when the circumstances of the crime are aggravating factors and
bear on predictions of future dangerousness.” (citations omitted)).
196. Id. at 181.
197. 572 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
198. Id. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 2756.
200. Id. at 2759.
201. Id.
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Legislative decisions to abolish the death penalty in order to eliminate
the risk of executing the innocent lend support to this line of reasoning.
The concern over mistakes—over executing the innocent—was the single
most important issue for death penalty opponents. As the risk of executing
the innocent begins to take greater prominence in the courts as an Eighth
Amendment concern, the data we analyzed in our study corroborates that
it is significant to legislators, and suggests that a capital punishment
system that bears a significant risk of executing the innocent might
contravene our “evolving standards of decency.”
CONCLUSION
The Court’s reliance on legislation as a singularly influential “objective
indicator” of “evolving standards of decency” cloaks legislative action
with constitutional significance. The questions of how closely legislation
tracks community values and how legislators understand their dual roles
are thus of fundamental importance to the trajectory of Eighth
Amendment doctrine.
By aggregating and categorizing the floor statements from the
legislative debates leading to the abolition of the death penalty in
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska, we present a picture of how
legislators reached the weighty decision to abolish the death penalty—a
picture that is useful for its own sake. The data set obtained also provides
a baseline from which to critically analyze the Court’s use of legislation
as “objective indicators” of “evolving standards of decency.” Our analysis
here led us to three primary observations. First, while we recognize that
legislation has some value as evidence of contemporary values, the
legislative history behind the passage of these death penalty laws prompts
a degree of caution. In our case studies, we found support for the critique
that legislation may diverge from popular opinion and that legislation
represents an abstracted form of moral reasoning. Second, we found little
evidence to suggest that legislators understand that the laws they enact
impact the constitutionality of the death penalty nationwide—a lack of
awareness that may have positive and negative effects. And third, we
noted that the foremost moral concern animating the prevailing
legislators—concern over executing the innocent—might itself have
Eighth Amendment significance as an indicator of “evolving standards of
decency.”

